






No scholar or researcher is able to provide robust evidence that counters
the scant reﬂection on metatheory – mostly ontology and epistemology –
underlying management studies in general, and industrial marketing and
purchasing research in particular. This paper is a contribution to the
indispensable discussion of metatheoretical alternatives in research, and
most importantly, the strengths and shortcomings thereof, and respective
implications on research questions, objectives, and ﬁndings.
1. INTRODUCTION
‘‘Metatheory’’ is ‘‘what lies beyond or outside any substantive theory,
empirical research, or human practice’’ (Fleetwood & Ackroyd, 2004a).
Metatheory thus paves the way for the substantive theory that one is likely
to create or endorse, the empirical research that one is likely to undertake
(by drawing somewhat on a theory, framework, model, or hypothesis), or
the practice that one is likely to effect. Despite the (latent) primacy of
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metatheory in analytical and empirical research, metatheoretical discussions
are seldom found in papers or books – the notable exception being those in
the philosophy ﬁeld of study. This state of affairs is of concern to scholars
and researchers for often leads to incoherent ontological and epistemolo-
gical assumptions, and most importantly, to unintelligibility of both one’s
arguments and others’ criticisms.
Any research inevitably builds on a particular ontology (i.e., how the
world is), epistemology (i.e., how the world can be known), methodology
(i.e., what methods to use in the world’s inquiry), and etiology (i.e., what
are the world’s underlying causes). Every scholar and researcher hold to
diverse extents those assumptions, thus embracing a distinct metatheory or
‘‘philosophy of science.’’ Scholars and researchers should make metatheore-
tical commitments unambiguous, if not explicit. Questions set forth and
objectives aimed for in research and foremost ﬁndings (both theoretical
contributions and managerial implications) pointed out by scholars and
researchers are all likely to differ according to metatheoretical points of
departure. Likewise, any comments on or scrutiny of works need to be made
by taking the respective metatheory of scholars and researchers into
consideration.
Social scholars and researchers adopt often implicitly one of three
(mutually exclusive) metatheories (Fleetwood, 2005): ‘‘positivism,’’ ‘‘post-
modernism,’’ or ‘‘critical realism.’’ Whereas positivists see the social world
as a closed system wherein cause–effect relations can be readily observed or
experienced, postmodernists’ diametrical viewpoint is that the social world
is fully socially constructed by humankind. For critical realists, the social
world is an open system whose existence is largely independent of any
knowledge one may have or develop and social science should be critical
concerning the social world that aims to tentatively describe and explain.
The structure of the paper’s remainder is the following. The next section
provides a brief vista on history of science. The third section addresses in
detail ontological, epistemological, methodological, and etiological postu-
lates of metatheories that scholars and researchers deploy (for the most part,
unknowingly) in social research, namely positivism, postmodernism, and
critical realism. Finally, concluding remarks ensue.
2. A VISTA ON HISTORY OF SCIENCE
‘‘Science’’ derives from the Latin word ‘‘scientia,’’ broadly meaning
‘‘knowledge.’’ Science is the rigorous and time-consuming activity through
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which the world is systematically inquired, described, and explained –
though one is likely to take science as including all the outcomes produced
by that activity. Science pertains to the production and use of theoretical
and empirical knowledge by scientists (i.e., scholars and researchers) and to
that scientiﬁc knowledge per se.
Origins of science can be traced back to the 6th century BC when pre-
Socratic philosophers in ‘‘Antiquity’’ (later followed by prominent others
such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in 5th and 4th centuries BC)
ﬁrst attempt to discover the world’s governing principles – so-called
‘‘metaphysics.’’ Pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, among which one can ﬁnd
Thales, Anaximander, Pythagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, and Parme-
nides, are largely responsible for the transition in western thought from the
‘‘myth’’ to the ‘‘logos’’ (the Greek term for ‘‘reason’’) – a radical shift that
implied abandoning hitherto common theological or supernatural explana-
tions of the world and searching for and proposing rational, logic explana-
tions instead. From that time onward, the world’s study through logical
reasoning or ‘‘philosophy’’ (or in Greek, ‘‘the love of wisdom’’) is underway
and kindred ‘‘logocentrism’’ (i.e., the belief that pursuit of ‘‘pure reason’’
leads to the discovery of the world’s underlying substance) predominates.
‘‘The Middle Ages,’’ that is, the western history period between ancient
(both Greek and Roman) times and modern era, are heavily marked by a
movement known as ‘‘scholasticism.’’ Between the 11th and 14th centuries,
scholastics attempt to combine theology and philosophy – the most widely
known of combinations being the 13th century synthesis of Christian faith
and Aristotelian metaphysics performed by Saint Thomas Aquinas.
Medieval inquiry of the world is ﬁrst conducted at large within monasteries,
and later on expanded to other, more proper locations: the ﬁrst universities
created in the late 11th and 12th centuries in Italy, England, and France.
Medieval universities founded throughout Europe by then amount to more
than 60. The ﬁrst university ever founded, however, dates back to the
5th century when a learning center of philosophy, astronomy, and other
subjects is created in Constantinople (currently Istanbul in Turkey) –
formally founded in the 9th century, Constantinople’s university lasts until
the 14th century.
The postmedieval period, spanning from the 16th century to present
times, is ‘‘Modernity.’’ Since the ‘‘scientiﬁc method’’ is ﬁrst proposed in
this period, earlier inquiries of the world are considered as ‘‘prescientiﬁc.’’
The scientiﬁc method is composed of the necessary principles for the
performance of (scientiﬁc) investigations, namely observation or experi-
mentation of phenomena; formulation of hypotheses concerning the
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phenomena, via ‘‘induction’’ (i.e., ‘‘the move from the particular to the
general’’); tests to demonstrate truth or falsity of proposed hypotheses,
through ‘‘deduction’’ (i.e., ‘‘the move from the general to the particular’’);
and ﬁnally, the veriﬁcation of or the need to modify hypotheses. Usually
rooted in the ‘‘empiricist’’ tradition, hence privileging the use of quantitative
research methods and techniques (see Section 3.1), the scientiﬁc method is
ﬁrst employed in natural science and then ‘‘appropriated’’ massively by
social scientists.
Modernity includes at least two distinct epochs: the ‘‘Age of reason’’ and
‘‘Age of enlightenment’’ in the 17th and 18th centuries, respectively – some
historians nevertheless take the former Age to be a part of the latter. The
Age of Reason signals the end of the Middle Ages during which faith
commands reason and imposes a scholastic stamp on the world’s knowl-
edge. ‘‘Rationalism’’ (i.e., the belief, that reason rather than experience is
the primary source of knowledge) expounded by prominent philosophers
such as Rene´ Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and Gottfried Leibniz, prevails.
Rationalist positions are later challenged by ‘‘empiricism,’’ the distinguish-
ing feature of the Age of Enlightenment. Leading empiricists (namely, John
Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume) claim that all that can be known
results only from human sensory experience.
Empiricist philosophy’s basis, however, is found earlier (in the beginning
of the 17th century) when Francis Bacon ﬁrst proposes the ‘‘inductive
method’’ through which one can arrive at universal claims about the world
by drawing on multiple observations and experiments and thus discovering
‘‘event regularities’’ or ‘‘constant conjunctions of events.’’ Despite rational-
ism being in principle opposed to empiricism, one needs to acknowledge that
empiricist philosophers are not totally against the use of reason nor do fail to
deploy reason (where necessary) in the world’s inquiries.
Nineteenth century witnesses the development of ‘‘idealism’’ and
‘‘positivism.’’ These two philosophies seem to be elaborations of rationalist
and empiricist standpoints, respectively. While idealism posited by Georg
Hegel and others contends that the world is merely composed of ideas
(i.e., the world exists primarily as human consciousness or spirit), the
positivism of Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill emphasizes sense
perceptions as unique sources of knowledge. One is prone to say that
idealism is a reaction to the materialist position that advocates that the
world is matter, essentially physical.
Materialism is formulated as early as the 4th century BC (when the Greek
natural philosopher Democritus ﬁrst proposed ‘‘atomism,’’ a theory arguing
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for the world as merely including atoms and empty space) and renewed in
the 17th century, for instance, by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes.
Early in the 20th century, positivism underwent a period of systematic
reﬂection driven primarily by the ‘‘Vienna circle’’ and the ‘‘Berlin circle,’’
two groups of philosophers and scientists (e.g., Rudolf Carnap and Carl
Gustav Hempel, respectively) formed in the 1920s that met regularly to
investigate philosophy of science. Karl Popper later on criticizes and extends
the positivism advocated by the Vienna circle.
Scientiﬁc progress during Modernity in both natural and social science
(especially in 19th and 20th centuries), at large shaped by the empiricist/
positivist stance, is overwhelming. Major advancements in physics
(e.g., Isaac Newton’s ‘‘Law of Gravitation’’), chemistry (e.g., determination
of oxygen’s role in combustion and respiration or advancement of the
ﬁrst period table of chemical elements by Antoine Lavoisier), or biology
(e.g., theory of evolution by natural selection put forward by Charles
Darwin) are all ﬁne examples of steady progress in knowledge of the
world. That scientiﬁc proliﬁcacy seduces many social scientists into the
belief that positivism can do for social science what has done for natural
science. Over time, positivism gradually disseminates into almost all ﬁelds
of social science, including management research. Since the mid-20th
century, however, positivism is under challenge. For the most part,
philosophers of science are increasingly calling into question the soundness
of postmodernism in social science. Responses to positivism, often as a
whole referred to as ‘‘postpositivism,’’ can be divided in two: ‘‘postmodern-
ism’’ – also entitled ‘‘poststructuralism,’’ ‘‘(strong) social constructionism’’
or ‘‘(strong) social constructivism’’ – featured, for instance, by Alexandre
Koyre´, Thomas Kuhn, or Paul Feyerabend; and ‘‘realism’’ of Roy Bhaskar
and Rom Harre´ among others. While sharing an animosity to positivism,
postmodernists and realists differ fundamentally on ontology: either the
social, mostly discursive construction of the world (postmodernism) or
the world’s mind-independence (realism). Realist foundations are laid
down by the ‘‘transcendental idealism’’ of the 18th century German
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1781 [1999]). For Kant, human experience
of the world is about how the world appears to human beings, not
about how the world is in and of itself – thus distinguishing between
‘‘things-in-themselves’’ (i.e., ‘‘noumena’’) and human perceptions and
conceptions of those things (i.e., ‘‘phenomena’’). Kant takes the world to
have a (more or less apprehensible) structure beyond and independent of
human knowledge.
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3. ALTERNATIVE METATHEORIES
IN (SOCIAL) RESEARCH
The world divides into ‘‘natural’’ and ‘‘social,’’ that is, ‘‘nature’’ and
‘‘society,’’ respectively – the former is inquired by natural science and the
latter is the object of study in social science. Science (both natural and
social) aims to develop and improve human understanding of the world,
thus reducing ignorance and liberating humankind from the restricting
inﬂuence of dogmas and falsehoods on human behavior (Sayer, 2000).
Social science in particular enables and encourages societal emancipation by
fostering the development of knowledge (Collier, 1998). Emancipation, that
is, ‘‘(y) the process through which individuals and groups become freed
from repressive social and ideological conditions, in particular those that
place socially unnecessary restrictions on the development and articulation
of human consciousness’’ (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992, p. 432), requires,
however, more than (new) knowledge: changes in the world’s practice, often
motivated by that knowledge, are necessary (Sayer, 2000).
Scholars and researchers necessarily rely on some assumptions whenever
undertaking research. Those assumptions, which every ‘‘good’’ scholar and
researcher should be aware of (and if necessary make explicit), concern the
following: ﬁrst, the way the world is thought to be (ontology); second, how
the world can be known (epistemology); third, which research methods and
techniques to employ in the world’s study (methodology); and ﬁnally, what
causes make and change the world (etiology). Ontology relates to the nature
or substance of the world, that is, the (kind of) ‘‘things’’ that exist in the
world. Epistemology, on the other hand, is focused on how human beings
can acquire or develop knowledge of the world. Ontology and epistemology
are clearly distinguished: the ‘‘nature of being’’ and the ‘‘knowledge of
being,’’ respectively (see, e.g., Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000a). Methodology
is focused on the methods and techniques to deploy in the world’s inquiry,
mostly in scientiﬁc research. Finally, etiology concerns the causes underlying
the world. Ontology is the overriding metatheoretical dimension that
strongly inﬂuences epistemology, methodology, and etiology.
Ontological, epistemological, methodological, and etiological assump-
tions constitute the ‘‘metatheories’’ or ‘‘philosophies of science’’ of scholars
and researchers, namely positivism, postmodernism, and (critical) realism.
Although positivists take the world as mind-independent, thus objectively
‘‘given’’ (by observation and experimentation), postmodernists argue that
the world is socially (and discursively) constructed by humans; for (critical)
realists, the world is complexly brought about by interlocking causes and
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one needs to be critical of the object of study in social research – plain
realism is applied only in natural science.
Metatheories should not be confused with the substantive theories that
one usually employs or devises in research – though any metatheory
inﬂuences to some extent the substantive theory adopted or created by
scholars and researchers. The relation between metatheory and theory
is loose rather than tight (Sayer, 2004): having the ‘‘right’’ metatheory
does not necessarily leads one to develop a ‘‘right’’ or unchallengeable
theory; yet, one is very unlikely to arrive at a ‘‘right’’ theory by drawing
on a ‘‘wrong’’ metatheory (though this can happen by pure chance).
Both metatheories and theories change – the latter changing more often and
sometimes radically.
Metatheory and theory are issues infrequently discussed by management
scholars and researchers (Tsoukas, 1994). Although metatheory is almost
altogether neglected (Fleetwood, 2007b), theory is rarely an object of
analysis within management subﬁelds of study. To the best of the author’s
knowledge, worthy exceptions on metatheoretical reﬂections include the
following: Tsoukas’ (1989) and Easton’s (2000) arguments in favor of the
epistemological suitability of case research; discussions promoted by
Lawson (1997) and Fleetwood (1999a) on the adequate metatheoretical
basis for economics; Easton’s (2002) apologia for a critical realist standpoint
in the industrial marketing and purchasing ﬁeld of study; discussions on
ontological and epistemological issues in management studies primarily
from either a postmodernist or realist perspective (e.g., Jones & Bos,
2007; Westwood & Clegg, 2003). Abstract reﬂections on theory include,
for instance, the Academy of Management Review’s 1989 and 1999 fora on
‘‘theory building and improving’’ and ‘‘theory testing’’ (Langley, 1999;
Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Tsang & Kwan, 1999; Van de Ven, 1989; Weick,
1989; e.g., Weick, 1999; Whetten, 1989) and a forum on ‘‘what theory is
not’’ (DiMaggio, 1995; Sutton & Staw, 1995; Weick, 1995) and Astley’s
(1985) paper in the Administrative Science Quarterly.
Where metatheoretical commitments are unclear or remain unexamined
(or worse, are ‘‘buried’’ within developed or espoused theories), one is likely
to ﬁnd scholars and researchers at cross-purposes, talking past one another
instead of engaging in constructive and intelligible debates. This is the case
with some of ‘‘postmodernism versus realism’’ dissensions: see, for instance,
a heated skirmish taking place in the strategic management ﬁeld over
appropriate metatheoretical presumptions between Kwan and Tsang (2001)
and Mir and Watson (2001, 2000). In the ‘‘battle’’ of theoretical or empirical
disagreements, social scholars and researchers often reject the descent to the
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metatheoretical level – on occasion by claiming (in case of metatheoretical
ﬂaws clearly identiﬁed in one’s work) to be just reproducing ontological
inconsistencies of objects of study, for instance, lay persons. Social scholars
and researchers know, however, that such reproduction is unacceptable
and should instead critically report ‘‘ontological oscillations,’’ that is,
identify inconsistencies and comment on possible causes and consequences
(Fleetwood, 2005). All scholars and researchers beneﬁt from being explicit
about and mindful of own ontology – though there is the remote possibility
that a scholar or researcher straddles intendedly two different ontologies
(Fleetwood, 2007a). See, for instance, Sousa and Castro (this volume) on a
discussion of the causes of relationship signiﬁcance, by explicitly drawing on
a critical realist metatheory.
Social science in general and management research in particular, since
inception in the ﬁrst decades of the 20th century, are dominated by
positivism. Fleetwood (2007a) advances two motives accounting for the
positivist orthodoxy: most of the research methods courses attended by
postgraduates in universities draw (at least implicitly) on positivism,
focusing exclusively on quantitative methods and techniques; and as the
courses on philosophy of science are extremely rare to ﬁnd in universities,
thus leaving absent the valuable discussion on the adequacy and short-
comings of each of the available metatheories. Unsurprisingly, many social
scholars and researchers are unaware of the deﬁciencies of positivism and
that metatheoretical alternatives do exist.
Some social scholars and researchers, however, start to challenge the
dominant metatheory, especially from the 1980s onward. Postmodernism
arose as a ﬁerce and shocking reaction to the positivist orthodoxy that
claims the world to be objectively available and capable of being easily
known by the systematic application of empirical research techniques.
The development of postmodernism is often denoted as the ‘‘turn to
discourse’’ or the ‘‘linguistic turn’’ in science. The distinguishing feature
of a postmodernist view is the belief that the world is not known objectively
at all and what is known is merely the sole creation of humankind, that is,
the outcome of variegated aims, actions, and interactions, and conventions
of humans.
Some of those who call into question the suitability of (prevailing)
positivism encounter or stumble on what they take to be the only
alternative, namely postmodernism – as if only two competing metatheories
are available to inform and guide research. The common line of reasoning is
that the world is either objective or merely the product of human discourse.
It is very common to ﬁnd postmodernists wrongly treating (critical) realism
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as synonymous with or a disguise of positivism, as if the empirical or naive
realism of positivists and the critical (or qualiﬁed version of ) realism are
the same thing (e.g., Mir & Watson, 2000, pp. 944–945). This explains
why many postmodernists think that the only alternative to the spurious
‘‘scientiﬁcity’’ of positivism (and useless quest for ‘‘absolute truths’’) is
‘‘relativism’’ or ‘‘conventionalism,’’ that is to say, that truth is relative
to proponents or collectively agreed upon, respectively. What is striking is
that postmodernists posit an impoverished realism when assume the
existence of discursive or ideal entities only (Fleetwood, 2005) – see more
on postmodernist ontology (Section 3.2).
Rejection of positivism does not mandate an allegiance to postmodern-
ism, for there is (critical) realism. Positivists and realists, despite sharing in
part the assumption of a mind-independent world, differ strongly with
respect to the existence of observables and unobservables in the world.
Positivists take observation and experimentation procedures as primordial
ways to attest ontological claims, thus privileging the observable over the
unobservable – the ‘‘empiricist prejudice’’ (Fleetwood, 2002a). Positivists
thus fail to take the existence of unobservables into account – or at the least
neglect unobservables. Realists, however, consider both the observables and
unobservables of the world as objects of potential inquiry.
The work of some reputed social scholars and researchers is rooted
neither in positivist nor in postmodernist metatheories. For instance, widely
known economists such as John Commons, Friedrich Hayek, Nicholas
Kaldor, John Keynes, Carl Menger, George Shackle, Adam Smith, Joseph
Schumpeter, and Thorstein Veblen, and reputed sociologists as Karl Marx
and Max Weber, all draw on various forms of realism – despite for the most
part not using the term ‘‘realism’’ (Fleetwood, 1999b). Realism is not a
recent metatheoretical reaction against postmodernism. No late ‘‘realist
turn’’ occurred in science (cf. Contu & Willmott, 2005; Reed, 2005). Yet,
realism only gains prominence since the mid-1970s, after the sophisticated
variant known as critical realism is carefully articulated and reﬁned by
Bhaskar (1975) and others (e.g., Harre´ & Madden, 1975; Sayer, 1984).
Collier (1994) addresses the pivotal inﬂuence of Bhaskar on the develop-
ment of critical realism. For incisive introductions to critical realism, see,
for instance, Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson, and Norrie (1998) and
Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, and Karlsson (1997).
Popularity of postmodernism notwithstanding, many scholars and
researchers are now increasingly prone to endorse critical realism.
Indeed, one can ﬁnd multiple examples of scholars and researchers who
adopt (mostly in an implicit way) a realist perspective in social research.
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By acknowledging that the world includes phenomena that exist indepen-
dently of any knowledge, a large number of scholars and researchers may be
called ‘‘minimal realists’’ (Sayer, 2004). Ackroyd and Fleetwood’s (2000b)
and Fleetwood and Ackroyd’s (2004a) edited volumes are instances of
the growing number of realist-inspired works across various subﬁelds
of management, from human resource management through operations
management to industrial marketing and purchasing and others. Realism
even seems to be the orthodoxy among management practitioners, as
Fleetwood and Ackroyd (2004b) and Hesketh and Fleetwood (2006)
observe.
This paper addresses seriatim the three metatheories that scholars and
researchers employ (explicitly or implicitly) in social research. Positivism
and postmodernism are both presented at large uncritically, along with
(unsound) respective views of ontology, epistemology, methodology, and
etiology. Criticisms to positivist and postmodernist standpoints are
suspended until critical realism is detailed.
3.1. Positivism
Positivism, also often referred to (in various versions) as empiricism,
‘‘foundationalism,’’ ‘‘instrumentalism,’’ ‘‘logicism,’’ ‘‘modernism,’’ ‘‘objec-
tivism,’’ or ‘‘scientism,’’ is the orthodox metatheory deployed in natural
and social science. Although one can encounter many versions of positivism,
this paper addresses the variant in which positivism is conventionally
depicted, or as Easton (2000, p. 212) perceptively says, its ‘‘lowest common
denominator version.’’
In general, positivists do not engage in (allegedly useless and sterile)
metatheoretical discussions. Positivists just ‘‘get on with research,’’ taking
for granted the metatheory available (positivism) and ignoring metatheore-
tical alternatives (postmodernism and critical realism). Positivism builds on
several assumptions: an empirical realist ontology, equivalence of explana-
tion and prediction, large-scale deployment of induction and deduction, and
universality of closed systems and the conception of causality as cause–effect
relations (resulting from presumed ontology and epistemology). Hempel
and Oppenheim’s (1948) analysis of the essential characteristics of scientiﬁc
explanations is a ﬁne example of the positivist standpoint in science – one
encounters passim therein both explicit and implicit references to positivist
postulates (see, e.g., p. 142 on latent assumptions of ubiquity of closed
systems and constant conjunctions of events).
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3.1.1. Ontology
Positivists advocate an empirical realist ontology: there is a world ‘‘out
there’’ composed of observable, perceptible, measurable, and quantiﬁable
phenomena, all waiting to be discovered, sensed, and explained by humans.
Phenomena, however, exist regardless of human knowledge whatsoever.
That is, the world predates human beings though, ontologically speaking, all
that exists can be known by humankind (via observations or experiments).
In other words, what cannot be observed or experienced is unlikely to exist –
at the very least, is ruled out of scientiﬁc research. Positivists do not deny
a priori the existence of phenomena that cannot be known (i.e., observed or
experienced), but are prone to exclude that phenomena from inquiries
(Fleetwood, 2001). Some philosophers of science (e.g., Muller & van
Fraassen, 2008; van Fraassen, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c) try to extend the scope
of empiricism to include phenomena that, despite inaccessible to the naked
eye, can nevertheless be observed through the use of various instruments,
for instance, microscopes or telescopes. Yet this sophisticated ‘‘empirical
stance’’ is not usually taken up by positivists in social research who
still privilege that, which can be observed, experimented, and as a result
somehow measured.
3.1.2. Epistemology
Positivists endorse Locke’s (1690 [1998]) belief that the human mind is
born blank – a ‘‘tabula rasa’’ or a ‘‘blank slate’’ – on which the world
‘‘writes’’ through experience of ﬁve human senses (namely, sight, hearing,
touch, taste, and smell). Positivism presumes a clear-cut distinction
between ‘‘subject’’ and ‘‘object’’ – a distinction which Sayer (1984) argues
to be strongly rooted in a set of parallel dualisms (e.g., ‘‘reason–emotion,’’
‘‘mind–body,’’ ‘‘fact–opinion,’’ and ‘‘thought–action’’) in which left-hand
terms are unequivocally superior to right-hand ones.
Positivism assumes the existence of a direct and largely theory-neutral
access to the world, through observation or experimentation. One is
likely to ﬁnd empirical research on which the world’s phenomena are
recorded, measured, and quantiﬁed, even without the guidance of any
substantial theoretical basis (Fleetwood, 2007a). All knowledge of the
world results from the observation or experimentation of multiple instances
of phenomena, namely ‘‘event regularities.’’ From the application of
scientiﬁc procedures follows inductive generalization (from the ‘‘sample’’
to the ‘‘population’’ under study) and thus postulation of universal laws
governing the world. Positivism features a nomothetical or instrumentalist
(i.e., ‘‘law-seeking’’) approach reigns.
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Quest for Truth in Positivist Science. Positivists pursue ﬁercely the truth of
(scientiﬁc) knowledge, hence attempting to make that knowledge a perfect
mirror or accurate representation of the world. Truth of knowledge claims is
assessed through empirical tests of hypotheses (postulated via induction).
Truth is established whenever veriﬁcation is empirically achieved or instead,
as Popper (1963, 1959) contends, whenever falsiﬁcation cannot be attained.
Truth is, therefore, obtainable (without major problems) by following
the rules of ‘‘good’’ scientiﬁc practice. Positivists can thus be accused of
foundationalism, for all scientiﬁc knowledge produced is given a character
of absolute truth (or complete objectivity or validity) in the sense that
that knowledge is totally independent of subjectively held beliefs of
producers (i.e., scholars and researchers). At the same time, positivists
hold in notorious disregard other kinds of human knowledge (especially
lay knowledge) – this ‘‘intellectualist prejudice’’ is probably an unintended
consequence of the ‘‘enlightenment project’’ wherein positivism ﬁrst
emerges, a project that despite presupposing that scientiﬁc knowledge
must contribute decisively to ‘‘enlighten’’ society as a whole, beneﬁts mostly
the academic e´lite and deepens the intellectual-lay societal division of labor
(Sayer, 1984).
Positivists take a rather static view on scientiﬁc knowledge, seeing
that knowledge as a product that once developed by science can be easily
stored, accessed, and widely disseminated. The development process of
scientiﬁc knowledge is characterized by cumulative accretion and is usually
not subject to analysis or discussion. Positivists neglect or consider
irrelevant the sociology of science, that is to say, the conspicuous (yet not
determinant) inﬂuence of social conditions of and interrelations among
scholars and researchers in the creation, extension, and assessment of
scientiﬁc knowledge.
Prediction and Explanation. The main objective of positivist science is
prediction. The unequivocal criterion to evaluate the maturity of a science is
the predictive power of that science regarding the object of study. Prediction
(as objective) helps to reveal a striking feature of positivist science, namely
that positivists, when believe that they are capable of offering more or less
‘‘precise’’ predictions on a phenomenon, also feel capable of ‘‘explaining’’
that phenomenon – and whenever endowed with a ‘‘sound’’ explanation,
positivists can also ‘‘predict’’ future occurrences of the phenomenon.
The conﬂation of prediction with explanation, often referred to as the
‘‘symmetry thesis,’’ is recurrently found in positivist science – the primary
difference between the prediction and explanation being that the former is
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directed toward future occurrences of the phenomenon, whereas the latter is
only concerned with past occurrences. This conﬂation is discussed at length
in the critical realist epistemology (see Section 3.3.2).
3.1.3. Methodology
Positivists often employ (sometimes even without acknowledgment) a
version of the ‘‘deductive-nomological’’ (D-N) or ‘‘covering law’’ model by
which a phenomenon is explained or predicted through logically deducing
or inducing the phenomenon (i.e., ‘‘explanandum’’) from both a set of
antecedent conditions and the general laws governing such phenomenon
(i.e., ‘‘explanans’’; Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948, p. 138).
Positivists make an extensive use of induction and deduction in the
development of scientiﬁc explanations and predictions (D’Andrade, 1986),
in general by resorting to quantitative research techniques (e.g., variance
and regression analyses, structural equation modeling). That nomothetic
research, also labeled as ‘‘extensive’’ (Sayer, 1984, 2000), is tested mostly via
replication studies.
3.1.4. Etiology
Whenever searching for the cause of an event (i.e., whatever ‘‘produces’’
that event), positivists presume that cause to be another event, typically a
preceding one. Events are all that positivists have in the ontological locker:
‘‘[i]f one event is observed or hypothesized, one can seek only its cause in
terms of another observed or hypothesized event’’ (Fleetwood, 2001,
pp. 206–207). Although events are a priori atomistic, one is likely to ﬁnd (via
observation or experimentation) certain events that are related by successive
occurrence over time. Inasmuch as events are constantly conjoined, events’
temporal succession is equated with causality. Cause–effect relations are
likely to be readily identiﬁed by positivists: that, for instance, the event Y
is ‘‘caused by’’ the event X, also possibly styled as ‘‘Y ¼ f(X).’’ An event
(measured or approximated in a ‘‘dependent variable’’) is a ‘‘function of’’
the preceding event (measured or approximated in an ‘‘independent
variable’’) for changes in the magnitude of the latter account for (i.e.,
‘‘explain’’) changes in the magnitude of the former. The obsession with
measurement and quantiﬁcation (in attempt to facilitate statistical
manipulation of variables and perform tests of hypotheses) leads positivists
to inadequate conceptualizations at least of social phenomena, for the
mostly qualitative and multidimensional nature of the social world is
overlooked (Hesketh & Fleetwood, 2006).
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Causality is couched in terms of ‘‘functional’’ relations, thus boiling down
to constant conjunctions of events, that is to say, (‘‘lawful’’ or ‘‘law-like’’)
event regularities (Fleetwood, 2001). These (deterministic or stochastic) laws
governing the world are, respectively, styled by positivists as, for instance,
‘‘whenever event X, event Y follows’’ or ‘‘whenever events X, Y, and Z,
event W (on average or with K probability) follows.’’ That conception
of causality – often denoted as ‘‘Humean causality,’’ after Hume (1739
[1985]) – is valid only in a world wherein closed systems prevail. Humean
causality, therefore, implies that the world as a whole is a closed system,
which neither contemplates endogenous change nor is subject to varying
exogenous inﬂuences. According to Bhaskar (1975), a closed system
necessarily complies with two closure conditions: absence of internal change
within the system of interest (internal closure condition); and constancy
of external inﬂuences over that system, that is to say, ‘‘other things being
equal’’ (external closure condition). An open system fails to meet one or
both of closure conditions. The realist view of open and closed systems
differs from that of ‘‘systems theory’’ – a transdisciplinary theory founded in
the 1950s by the Austrian-born biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1850)
who studies the structure and properties of systems. Advocates of systems
theory take each phenomenon as a structure, that is, an ensemble composed
of several interacting and interdependent parts that give rise to emergent
properties (not found in constituents alone) – in contrast to classical
‘‘reductionist’’ approaches focused on a single element of phenomena.
Systems theory classiﬁes systems as open or closed depending on the
presence or absence, respectively, of the system’s interaction with
surrounding environment, whereas critical realists add the requirement of
lack of internal change for a system to be closed. Systems theory seemingly
takes for granted the inevitability of any system’s internal change.
3.2. Postmodernism
Postmodernism arises in the early 1970s as a ﬁerce and shocking reaction
to the positivist orthodoxy ruling in the social science: for instance, ‘‘theory-
neutral observation’’ postulated by positivism is promptly rejected by
postmodernists that endorse instead ‘‘observation-neutral theory’’ (Sayer,
2000). Postmodernism is also frequently called (and incorrectly equated
with) ‘‘conventionalism,’’ ‘‘idealism,’’ ‘‘interpretivism,’’ ‘‘relativism,’’
‘‘(strong) social constructionism’’ or ‘‘(strong) social constructivism,’’ or
‘‘subjectivism.’’ The development of postmodernism is often denoted as the
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‘‘turn to discourse’’ or the ‘‘linguistic turn’’ in science – the notions of
‘‘discourse,’’ ‘‘language,’’ and ‘‘rhetoric’’ (and sometimes even ‘‘thought’’
and ‘‘knowledge’’) are used interchangeably by postmodernists as referring
to instruments by which one constructs the world.
Although not avoiding reﬂections on metatheoretical issues (particularly
in harsh criticisms of positivism), postmodernists usually overlook critical
realism (see, e.g., Frankel, 1986; Heller, 2001; Westwood & Clegg, 2003) and
normally conﬂate philosophy of science with sociology of science – as if
social relations within and among scientiﬁc communities determine per se
the ontological, epistemological, methodological, and etiological assump-
tions of scholars and researchers.
3.2.1. Ontology
Postmodernism’s ontology is difﬁcult to ascertain because postmodernists
are in general ambiguous when make claims on the world’s constituents.
Although almost all postmodernists admit the centrality of discourse in the
discursive construction of the world, some postmodernists make the strong
claim that the world is entirely socially constructed by the human mind – or,
in other words, the world ‘‘lies in the eyes of the beholder’’ (Berger &
Luckman, 1966). A few postmodernists, however, are unwilling to make
such a strong claim and adopt – what Fleetwood (2005) calls – a ‘‘weak
social constructivist’’ or ‘‘weak social constructionist’’ position postulating
that only a part (but not all) of the world is socially constructed and
admitting the existence of extra-discursive phenomena. This ‘‘weak’’ version
of social constructivism is acceptable to critical realists.
One faces a concept- or theory-determined world, a world that does
not predate humans and may even not exist or stop existing if one somehow
(e.g., discursively) chooses so. The world is a ‘‘ﬁgment of human
imagination’’: ‘‘wishful thinking’’ prevails (i.e., the world is everyone’s
wishes for it) and multiple ‘‘realities’’ are thus likely to exist – as many as
available thoughts.
3.2.2. Epistemology
Conventionalism and Relativism. For postmodernists, multiple (scientiﬁc
and lay) knowledge claims can be arrived at via human ingenuity and
creativity (Kuhn, 1970) – and, in a truly ‘‘pomo’’ way, ‘‘anything goes’’
(Feyerabend, 1975). The epistemic status of those knowledge claims is
determined through human convention, being intersubjectively agreed
upon. Postmodernism contends that the absolute truth (strenuously aimed
to by positivists) is both meaningless and unachievable. On the contrary,
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the truth of a knowledge claim is ‘‘relative’’ to the extent that boils down to
a mere convention: truth is a matter of agreement, negotiation, and
collective consensus, therefore never being absolute. Inasmuch as the truth
of every knowledge claim (or theory) is always relative to respective
proponents or adherents, skepticism is likely to reign. This relativist stance
can be expressed in the following way: ‘‘As an X-ist, I believe only in Z and
W.’’ Any theory is thus observation-neutral, not being susceptible to
corroboration or refutation by the use of empirical data (Sayer, 2000).
In addition to this (kind of) relativism – that no knowledge claim can be
shown to be better than any other (so-called ‘‘judgmental relativism’’) – one
can ﬁnd ‘‘epistemic relativism,’’ that is, the world can only be known in
terms of human discourse.
Science and its Development Process. Postmodernists overemphasize
the discontinuities in the development process of science, depicting that
process as marked by lengthy periods of stability on occasion interrupted
by turbulent ‘‘scientiﬁc revolutions’’ or ‘‘paradigm shifts.’’ Kuhn (1970)
argues that science is essentially about ‘‘puzzle-solving’’ (i.e., ﬁnding
solutions to the ‘‘small’’ problems left unsolved by guiding analytical
‘‘paradigms’’). Several of those problems, however, resist solution, in
spite of multiple attempts over time to do so with the use of the ruling
paradigm: a trial-and-error period is then sure to follow, often culminating
with the replacement of the existing paradigm by a new paradigm that is
capable of solving the triggering ‘‘anomaly’’ – in Kuhn’s terminology.
Whenever embracing such a Kuhnian perspective, postmodernists see
scientiﬁc knowledge as divided into monolithic blocks, in general
mutually ‘‘incommensurable’’ (i.e., unintelligible) and thereby rule out
any possibility of theoretical cross-fertilization or of settling potential
intertheory disputes.
The primary goal of postmodernist science is to uncover the political
agendas (and the ‘‘hidden power’’) driving the social construction of the
world – see, for instance, Michel Foucault’s (1980) work on the close
relation between knowledge and power. Explanations offered by post-
modernists concern both whoever produces the world-shaping discourses
and why those performative discourses are collectively accepted. Predictions
are simply not part of postmodernist science’s agenda. Contra the
nomothetical perspective of positivism, postmodernists adopt an
‘‘idiographic’’ approach concerned with the ‘‘particular’’ (and its detailed
explanation), disdaining the discovery of allegedly general laws.
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3.2.3. Methodology
Postmodernists prefer to employ qualitative methods and techniques
in research (e.g., discourse analysis), probably an instinctive reaction
to the obsessive preference of positivists for quantitative research.
Many postmodernists go further, tacitly accepting Feyerabend’s (1975)
‘‘methodological anarchism’’ that strongly objects to any single (often
empiricist) research method as the only pathway to truth of knowledge.
Feyerabend argues in favor of the ‘‘methodological pluralism’’ in science,
claiming that prescriptive methodological guidelines limit severely the
activities of scholars and researchers, and as a consequence, restrict scientiﬁc
progress.
3.2.4. Etiology
Discourse is the fundamental cause governing the world – though one is
unlikely to ﬁnd explicit references to etiology in postmodernists’ knowledge
claims and even be perplexed to see that postmodernists, if inquired about
etiological assumptions, are likely to suggest that etiology is simply a social
construct, hence denying – in antirealist fashion – causality as an objective
feature of the world.
3.3. Critical Realism
Critical realism is developed by Bhaskar (1975) and others (e.g., Harre´ &
Madden, 1975) by building on Kant’s (1781 [1999]) transcendental
reasoning. In addition to the endorsed realist viewpoint, critical realism
argues for social science that is critical of the (social) world aimed to
tentatively describe and explain. Social scholars and researchers are urged
to be critical in accounts or claims (i.e., theories, conceptual frameworks,
models, or concepts) of objects of study, contributing to and reinforcing the
potential emancipatory role of social science. A critical social science
features not only research on ‘‘what is’’ but also criticisms on ‘‘what is’’ and
developments of ‘‘what might be’’ (Sayer, 2000). Social science must be both
positive and normative, therefore describing, explaining, and judging what
is the case as well as issuing prescriptions about what should be the case
(Sayer, 2004). This normative orientation is accounted for the world being
different from what one would like the world to be; otherwise, prescriptions
would be dispensable.
Critical realism is generally seen as an ‘‘underlaborer’’ and occasional
‘‘midwife’’ for a variety of substantive work in social science (Sayer, 1984).
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Critical realists are prone to reﬂect deliberately and extensively on
metatheory, offering several counterarguments to both positivist and
postmodernist worldviews.
3.3.1. Ontology
Critical realist ontology postulates the existence of a by and large mind-
independent world (Bhaskar, 1975). That is to say, almost all the world’s
‘‘entities’’ and ‘‘events’’ (as well as the ‘‘relations’’ within and among entities
and events) exist independently of one’s identiﬁcation (or knowledge).
To think otherwise is to presume that the world is but a reﬂection of human
knowledge – and this is an unfortunate ‘‘intellectualist’’ position. Fleetwood
(2005, pp. 198–199) prefers the term ‘‘identiﬁcation’’ to ‘‘knowledge’’ – of
the world as a whole or of its basic constituents – because the former
includes the latter (either in tacit or explicit form, i.e., ‘‘know-how’’ or
‘‘know-that,’’ respectively) as well as other human cognitive activities (e.g.,
observation, experimentation, and even conception and interpretation).
Rejection of the Empirical Realist Stance. Diverse entities and events, both
of which need not be observable, coexist in the world. In direct opposition to
the empirical realism of positivists (advocating that what one can observe is
all that exists), neither entities nor events of the world feature necessarily
materiality or are conﬁned to the realm of observable. For critical realists,
‘‘observability’’ (or its closest ally, ‘‘experimentability’’) is not the deﬁnitive
criterion that allows one to make ontological claims. As Fleetwood (2005,
p. 199, emphasis in original) says, ‘‘God may or may not be real, but the idea
of God is as real as mount Everest (y).’’ Positivists conﬂate ontology with
epistemology and thus can be accused of committing the ‘‘epistemic fallacy’’
(Bhaskar, 1975), reducing the world to what is (or can be) known via human
senses.
Although the world is composed of entities, events, and relations,
one is likely to take entities as the primordial components of the world:
relations are established, developed, sustained, and terminated by entities
only; and events are ‘‘produced’’ by entities, that is, events are brought
about whenever entities’ powers are exercised, under the restriction of
several contingencies (i.e., the presence or absence of other entities or
the exercise or dormancy of entities’ powers) – see section ‘‘Tendencies’’:
The ‘‘Transfactuality’’ of Powers.
The World’s Entities. Mind-independent existence applies to all kinds
of entities of the world: ‘‘material,’’ ‘‘ideal,’’ ‘‘social,’’ or ‘‘artifactual’’ ones
FILIPE J. SOUSA472
(Fleetwood, 2004). As illustrative examples: mountains and rocks, and
computers and tables (i.e., material and artifactual entities, respectively)
exist regardless of any knowledge one may develop or have of those entities;
accounts, symbols, and beliefs (i.e., ideal entities) endure independently of
respective proponents’ or adherents’ arguments as well as criticisms of
contenders; the United Nations, and the markets and networks in which
ﬁrms operate (i.e., social entities) exist regardless of respective creators and
the scholars and researchers aiming to build knowledge about the latter.
Fleetwood (2004) refers to material, ideal, social, and artifactual entities of
the world as the four ‘‘modes of reality.’’
Material entities are not devised by humankind (and would continue to
exist even in case of human beings’ extinction); on the other hand, ideal,
social, and artifactual entities are dependent for existence on the activities
of human. Yet, as Fleetwood (2004) argues, only some human beings
(namely scholars, researchers, and lay people) and some human activities
(in particular those related to identiﬁcation can be dispensed with) are
involved – some but not all of the time – in the reproduction and
transformation of ideal, social, and artifactual entities.
Fleetwood (2005) makes ﬁve remarks on the world’s entities: ﬁrst, entities
are likely to change over time; second, each entity needs not be of a unique
kind (e.g., despite usually seen as an ideal entity, a theory can also be
considered a social entity since is largely shaped by long-lasting
interpersonal relations that scholars and researchers establish, develop, and
sustain among themselves); third, social entities, like ideal ones, are in
essence immaterial; fourth, some postmodernists (particularly those adopt-
ing a strong social constructivist ontology) commit the mistake of merging
material, artifactual, and social entities into ideal ones, that is to say,
nondiscursive entities into discursive ones – as if extradiscursive phenomena
are but an epiphenomena of discourse; ﬁnally, critical realists recognize
that nondiscursive entities may have a discursive counterpart, that is to say,
all material, artifactual, and social entities can be a subject of discourse
whereby related ideal entities are created (e.g., a stone and the theory of that
stone’s origin and structure). One can discover that the referent of an ideal
entity is itself another ideal entity (e.g., a detailed explanation on the
evolution of a particular theory; Fleetwood, 2005).
Entities’ Relations: ‘‘Necessity’’ versus ‘‘Contingency’’. Critical realists
assume the existence of two kinds of relations within and between the
world’s entities: ‘‘necessary’’ and ‘‘contingent’’ relations, that is to say,
‘‘necessity’’ and ‘‘contingency.’’ Necessary relations stand for what
Metatheories in Research 473
inevitably ‘‘must go together,’’ while contingent relations represent what
‘‘can go together’’ but does not have to. The distinction between necessity
and contingency is summed up as ‘‘what must be the case’’ and ‘‘what can
be the case,’’ respectively (Sayer, 1984). One should stress that the term
‘‘contingent’’ holds here a different meaning from that usually assumed
(which is ‘‘to be dependent on’’), namely ‘‘neither necessary nor impossible’’
or in other words, ‘‘potential’’ (Sayer, 1984, 2000).
Although relations between entities are noteworthy, relations within
entities can also be identiﬁed (i.e., relations between entities’ structural
features). All entities of the world are by and large contingently related,
though some necessary relations among entities can also be found. The
openness of the world (see section Openness of the (Social) World) makes
the existence of necessary relations between events very unlikely. Events
can only be contingently related, for no constant conjunction of events
(or cause–effect relations) can be found in the world.
Necessity divides in two (Harre´ & Madden, 1998; Sayer, 1984): ‘‘natural’’
(or ‘‘material’’) and ‘‘logical’’ (or ‘‘conceptual’’). Whereas natural necessity
pertains to relations among the world’s material constituents, logical
necessity concerns relations among concepts or terms (e.g., as in ‘‘husband–
wife’’). Natural necessities often bring about conceptual necessities, that is
to say, the former are represented by scholars and researchers via scientiﬁc
discourse. A relation is necessary (e.g., between the entities ‘‘husband’’ and
‘‘wife’’) in the sense that what each of those entities is depends on its
standing in that relation, that is to say, each entity cannot exist without the
other (and ultimately without the relation itself ) – the existence of a
husband necessarily presupposes a wife’s existence, the change of husband is
tied to a wife’s change, and vice versa. On the contrary, when the relation
between two entities is contingent, then either of connected entities can exist
without the other (and without the relation): as an illustrative example,
a ‘‘man’’ can exist without a ‘‘woman’’ (and a man can change without
being implicated by, or implicating a woman’s change) as well as the other
way around. Necessary relations are not necessarily more important than
contingent ones (Sayer, 2000). Both necessary and contingent relations can
be equally important for connected entities. For instance, the contingent
relation of entity X with entity Y may be as important as (or even more
important than) X’s necessary relation with entity Z.
The world displays four notorious relations (Sayer, 1984), some of which
are addressed in sections below: necessary relations between the elements
composing each entity’s structure; necessary relations between the structure
and powers of each and every entity; contingent relations between an
FILIPE J. SOUSA474
entity’s powers and the effects resulting from the exercise of powers; and
contingent relations between an entity’s powers and surrounding contexts.
Another relation can be pointed out, in line with Fleetwood (2001):
necessary relations between the powers and ‘‘tendencies’’ of an entity –
tendencies being the effects that powers usually bring about. See more on
tendencies (or the ‘‘transfactuality’’ of powers) in section ‘‘Tendencies’’: The
‘‘Transfactuality’’ of powers.
One should bear in mind Sayer’s (1984) notes on change within and
symmetry of relations: ﬁrst, although change can happen within contingent
relations (e.g., contingently related entities can ‘‘causally’’ affect each other
in terms of respective powers), mutual change prevails only in necessary
relations (e.g., an entity’s powers change when the structure of that entity is
somehow modiﬁed); and second, necessary relations can be asymmetric to
the extent that one entity cannot exist without the other (and without that
relation) but not the other way around.
Although one is able to ﬁnd both necessity and contingency in the world –
some entities are necessarily related while others are only contingently
so – positivists take necessity to be absolutely absent from the world (Sayer,
1984, 2000). Positivists support both ‘‘ontological atomism’’ (i.e., ubiquity
of discreteness in the world) and the kindred ‘‘universal contingency’’
(i.e., all relations within and among the world’s constituents are contingent).
Structure and Powers of Entities. Each entity of the world has a peculiar
nature, exhibiting a set of structural properties that are in general
interlinked (Fleetwood, 2004). Although all entities are composed of
structures (which themselves can be microentities), some of those entities
are inserted into other, larger structures (i.e., meso- and macroentities;
Sayer, 2000). Consider the following example: ﬁrms (as entities) have
heterogeneous structures and by connecting with other structures (e.g.,
suppliers and customers), it is likely that interﬁrm relationships, nets, and
networks (that can be depicted as micro-, meso-, and macrostructures) are
brought about.
Each and every entity has an intrinsic nature that makes each entity the
kind of ‘‘thing’’ that it is and not anything else. By virtue of that nature,
each entity is endowed with a set of ‘‘causal powers and liabilities,’’ hence
being both capable of doing some things and incapable of doing others
(Harre´ & Madden, 1975) – for critical realists, ‘‘causal’’ is tantamount to
‘‘bring about change’’ (Sayer, 2004). For instance, human beings have the
powers to reason, talk, and invent (owing to human physiological and social
features), and ﬁrms have the power to generate goods or services (because of
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heterogeneous resource and competence endowments). Entities’ powers and
liabilities can also be denoted as ‘‘dispositions,’’ ‘‘potentialities,’’ or
‘‘capacities,’’ and ‘‘susceptibilities,’’ respectively (Fleetwood, 2001). In line
with Sayer (1984), an entity’s liabilities entail the absence of some of the
expected or desired powers. For ease of exposition, ‘‘causal powers and
liabilities’’ are simply referred to as ‘‘powers’’ henceforth.
By placing emphasis on the nature or structure of the world’s entities,
critical realism is often charged with the label of ‘‘essentialism.’’ That is,
critical realism is presumably focused on the discovery of a fundamental
(often singular and ﬁxed) essence of entities through a theory-neutral
observation and inductive reasoning. Critical realism, however, should
not be confused with essentialism: essentialism aims to identify both
‘‘generative’’ and ‘‘distinguishing’’ properties of entities (i.e., properties that
determine what an entity can and cannot do and properties that permit
that entity to be clearly distinguished from other entities, respectively);
critical realism aims only at the identiﬁcation of generative properties while
acknowledging the possibility of structural changes over time (Sayer, 2000).
Critical realism distinguishes between ‘‘essential’’ (or necessary) and
‘‘incidental’’ (or contingent) properties of entities (Sayer, 2000).
Emergence, Diversity, and Potential Exercise of Powers. Entities have
usually ‘‘emergent’’ powers. Powers of an entity emerge mostly from the
powers of individual structural constituents but also from powers of the
relations that that entity develops and maintains with other entities – this is
tantamount to say that powers are irreducible to any of (i.e., are more than
the sum of) these two referred powers.
For critical realists, not only entities have a structure, and as a con-
sequence, powers. Some of (necessary or contingent) relations that entities
establish, nurture, and sustain among themselves possess a particular
nature, hence being endowed with powers (Sayer, 1984, pp. 104–105). Some
scholars and researchers working under the sociologist ‘‘agency-structure’’
framework (Giddens, 1876; Parsons, 1937) claim that relational structures
are endowed with powers (e.g., see Elder-Vass, 2006; Fleetwood, 2007a).
For those scholars and researchers, ‘‘social structures’’ – such as those of
‘‘families,’’ ‘‘communities,’’ or ‘‘cultural groupings’’ – preexist (extant)
‘‘agents,’’ whereas agents draw on, reproduce, and transform social
structures over time: social structures are conditions for, and continuous
outcomes of, human agency. In brief, the entities’ relations can be causal.
Powers of any relation derive at large from powers of connected entities,
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primarily powers of the two parties directly connected via the relation but
also of others indirectly connected to them.
Not all entities of a given kind – naturally endowed with a similar nature,
that is, sharing a certain set of generative properties – have necessarily the
same powers. Similarity at one lower level stratum of the world (e.g.,
chemical or biological) need not imply similarity at another higher level
stratum (e.g., social): for instance, two individuals having the ‘‘same’’
physiological characteristics, some of which may even be unobservable or
difﬁcult to determine unambiguously (e.g., equal weight, height, and
muscular and cerebral masses), may exhibit radically different cognitive
and social abilities. The world’s stratiﬁcation is addressed in section World’s
Stratiﬁcation: The ‘‘Real,’’ ‘‘Actual,’’ and ‘‘Empirical’’ Domains.
An entity’s powers are not necessarily activated or exercised. For powers
exist irrespective of ensuing effects (i.e., the result of powers’ exercise).
In other words, any power does not depend for its existence on the effects
that is capable of generating, that is, the events that power can bring about
(Fleetwood, 2001). The tautology that an entity does something because it
has the intrinsic power to do so is thus avoided. Yet, though some powers
remain intact when unexercised, others are likely to deteriorate if are not put
to work, for instance, human powers to ride a bicycle or to speak a foreign
language, respectively (Sayer, 1984).
Contingencies Affecting the Exercise of Powers. Powers of an entity can
remain dormant to the extent that activation depends partly on – and
ensuing effects depend heavily on – surrounding, enabling, or constraining
conditions (e.g., spatial and temporal conditions, or presence or absence of
other entities and even the exercise or inactivation of powers of those entities
over time). Surrounding conditions impact primarily on the potential
exercise of powers (and as a consequence, ensuing effects) but can also affect
the nature of entities, for instance, somewhat contributing to structural
change. Sayer (2000) refers to these conditions, both diverse and changeable,
as ‘‘contingencies’’ or ‘‘contexts.’’
‘‘Tendencies’’: The ‘‘Transfactuality’’ of Powers. Owing to the existence of
contingencies (e.g., geohistorical ones), entities’ powers act ‘‘transfactually’’
inasmuch as the exercise of powers does not necessarily bring about events
expected to ensue (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000a). When a certain power is
exercised, normal outcomes may be impeded to be brought about by certain
contingencies, namely the exercise of counteracting powers (e.g., an aircraft
with the ‘‘power’’ to ﬂy can fail to do so in the presence of severe
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atmospherical conditions). On the contrary, a power acts ‘‘factually’’ when
effects are not deﬂected or countervailed by (the effects brought about by)
other powers, for instance, when surrounding contingencies are somehow
ﬁxed (Fleetwood, 2001) – such constancy is impossible to ensure in an open
world such as the social word, see section Openness of the (Social) World.
Effects resulting from the exercise of a power cannot be known a priori;
nevertheless, scholars and researchers are usually able to identify that
power’s tendency, that is, which effects that power ‘‘tends to’’ bring about
(Sayer, 1984). Consider, as an example, power P1 tends to E1 and E2 events.
That P1 has a tendency to bring about such events, however, is not
tantamount to say that E1 and E2 will inevitably result. A power ‘‘(y) does
not always bring about certain effects, but it always tends to. Hence, it acts
transfactually’’ (Fleetwood, 2001, p. 212, emphasis in original). In case of
hypothetical ﬁxedness of particular contingencies (particularly those that
are often conducive to the occurrence of E1 and E2), the power P1 would
not tend to but would surely bring those events about. One would be
nonsensical if makes the claim that a power tends to a particular event
‘‘only if ’’ certain contextual conditions are met. This realist conception of
‘‘tendency’’ is different from that of positivists for the latter employ
‘‘tendency’’ to connote the statistical character of certain (law-like) event
regularities styled, for example, as ‘‘whenever event X, event Y tends to
follow.’’
Powers, when and if de facto exercised (under whichever conditions),
bring about certain events. Resulting events, however, are not always the
ones expected to ensue from powers’ activation (e.g., owing to counteracting
powers prevailing). For instance, power P1, under condition C1 (i.e., event
E2 owing to activation of power P2), generally brings about event E1;
however, under conditions C2 and C3 (i.e., events E3 and E4 generated by P3
and P4 powers, and absence of E2, respectively), that same power P1
generates event E5.
Causal Mechanisms and Conﬁgurations in the (Nondeterministic)
World. The world’s events are codetermined, resulting from the con-
vergence of countless and interconnected powers possessed and exercised
by a myriad of entities, under a variety of mutable contingencies. Events
and entities of the world are brought about because of several webs of
interlocking ‘‘causal mechanisms’’ and ‘‘causal conﬁgurations’’ at work
simultaneously. Sayer (1984) deﬁnes a causal mechanism as ‘‘the given way
of acting of a power.’’ A causal mechanism exists whenever a few entities
(and internal structures and powers) are interrelated and are as a whole
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responsible for bringing about certain events, under particular
contingencies; when those entities are vast in number (and the connection
of structures and powers is far more complex), events are brought about by
a ‘‘causal conﬁguration.’’ Causal mechanism is an ensemble of powerful
structures (i.e., entities). If causal mechanisms are themselves complexly
interrelated, a causal conﬁguration is thus operating (see, e.g., Fleetwood,
2007a; Hesketh & Fleetwood, 2007). The distinction between causal
mechanisms and causal conﬁgurations is in essence one of number and
complexity (of causal structures and powers involved) – and the latter
encompasses the former, for a causal mechanism is merely a sub-, sub-sub
or sub-sub-sub-causal conﬁguration. For instance, one can look at the
marketing department of a small ﬁrm (including a handful of highly
competent individuals) as a causal mechanism capable of ‘‘generating’’
lasting business relationships with both suppliers and customers; however,
a large multinational ﬁrm (endowed with an enormous amount of valuable
resources and competences worldwide) is a causal conﬁguration given that
it is able to produce a high volume of throughput (of goods or services for
customers) and proﬁts (for corporate owners or shareholders).
Not only can one discover interdependences between causal mechanisms
and conﬁgurations (e.g., strong or weak, strengthening or restricting), but
one can also point out a hierarchy of causal mechanisms and conﬁgurations
in the codetermination of the world (Fleetwood, 2007a; Sayer, 1984). Causal
mechanisms and conﬁgurations should not be connoted with any kind
of determinism – as, for instance, positivists frequently do when deploy the
term ‘‘mechanism.’’ In sum, the world is governed by (or, more properly, is
the outcome of ) a diversity of cotendencies and countertendencies (brought
about by multiple coexisting causal mechanisms and conﬁgurations),
reinforcing or counteracting one another concurrently. See more on
etiological assumptions of critical realists, in section Scientiﬁc Research,
Mostly of a Qualitative Character.
Openness of the (Social) World. Since causal mechanisms and
conﬁgurations may remain inactive and the effects of powers’ exercise are
affected – reinforced or counteracted – by effects brought about by the
exercise of other mechanisms and conﬁgurations (i.e., events’ occurrence is
mediated by the inﬂuence of diverse contingencies), ‘‘what happens’’ does
not exhaust ‘‘what could have happened’’ (Sayer, 1984). For Bhaskar (1986,
p. 209), ‘‘[t]he world is not just the totality of what is actually the case,
but includes what might or could be (y) as well.’’ Or, in other words, ‘‘[t]he
actual is only a part of the real world, which also consists of non-actualised
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possibilities and unexercised powers of the already existing structures and
mechanisms that are transfactually efﬁcacious (y)’’ (Patomaki, 2006, p. 9).
The world is not predetermined, that is, the world is not a closed system.
Contrary to the determinism implied in general laws postulated by
positivists (a consequence of cause–effect relations and constant conjunc-
tions of events allegedly identiﬁed), the world is an open system (that
includes many open subsystems). In such open systems (and depending on
prevailing conditions), the same causal mechanism and conﬁguration may
produce different effects (under diverse contingencies); different mechan-
isms and conﬁgurations may generate the same effect; and event regularities,
if exist at all, are at the very best transitory or spatially restricted.
Not only is the social world an open system, the natural world is also
likewise, yet not completely (Sayer, 1984). Whereas no closed systems are
found in the social world, very few can be discovered in the natural world
(and even those systems are often not susceptible to human manipulation
or control). Some ‘‘quasi-closed’’ systems – where one or several causal
mechanisms and conﬁgurations are dominant, prevailing over others – can
however be found in natural and social worlds. For instance, the relative
constancy of throughput of a ﬁrm’s production process over time (attained
via a set of intendedly created routines and conventions) can lead one to
consider that ﬁrm as a quasi-closed system. It is possible to artiﬁcially design
closed systems in some experiments of natural science (e.g., in physics or
chemistry).
The openness of the world is corroborated by the world’s failure to
meet the two conditions that would ‘‘close the system’’: ﬁrst, entities and
structures and powers making up the world (or the intricate causal
mechanisms and conﬁgurations governing it) are prone to change gradually
or radically (e.g., human abilities to write, speak, learn, and invent change
via instruction and socialization with others); and second, contingencies
(affecting both the exercise of causal mechanisms and conﬁgurations and
resulting effects) also change over time – this ‘‘external’’ change pertains to
the modiﬁcation of structures and powers of certain entities for these
constitute themselves contingencies faced by other entities.
Sayer (2000, p. 95) points out four barriers to determinism in the world:
‘‘Firstly, whether causal powers (y) exist depends on the contingent
presence of certain structures or objects [i.e., entities]. Secondly, whether
these powers are ever exercised is contingent, not predetermined. Thirdly,
if and when they are ever exercised, their consequences will depend
on mediation – or neutralisation – by other contingently related phenomena.
A fourth possibility is that natural and social causal powers themselves
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(and not merely whether and in what circumstances they are exercised) can
be changed.’’
Despite the overwhelming evidence suggesting the openness of the world,
positivists commit – often for the sake of ‘‘methodological convenience’’ –
the mistake of treating the world ‘‘as if ’’ is (or could be) closed. And to close
the system of interest, positivists necessarily make unrealistic assumptions
(e.g., the ‘‘ceteris paribus’’ or ‘‘homo economicus’’ in economics).
Critical realists even argue that (known) ‘‘falsehoods’’ or ‘‘ﬁctions’’ are
piled up by positivists allowing the latter to artiﬁcially engender the closure
of the system of interest and evade the possibility of theory’s falsiﬁcation
(Fleetwood, 2002b). The artiﬁcial closure of systems entails performing
‘‘ﬁctionalization,’’ not an abstraction as positivists claim. Abstracting is not
equal to ﬁctionalizing and the former by no means entails the latter (as seen
in Section 3.3.3). ‘‘Ideal’’ or ‘‘ﬁctional’’ systems designed by positivists do
not approximate ‘‘real,’’ open ones.
And the knowledge arrived at in such contrived closed systems cannot
be transposed as valid into open systems (Fleetwood, 2001). Doing that
transposition implies committing the ‘‘ignoratio elenchi’’ fallacy because a
point would be grossly neglected, namely the nonubiquity of constant
conjunctions of events in (and the openness of ) the world.
World’s Stratiﬁcation: The ‘‘Real,’’ ‘‘Actual,’’ and ‘‘Empirical’’
Domains. Bhaskar (1975) notes that the world is stratiﬁed, as three
different domains or strata can be identiﬁed: the real (or the ‘‘deep,’’ as
many critical realists refer to it), the actual, and the empirical. Although the
world’s entities – and the causal mechanisms and conﬁgurations that entities
as a whole constitute – reside at the domain of the real (possibly being
unreachable to human senses), the exercise of powers and the ensuing effects
(i.e., events) can be observed or experienced only at the empirical stratum,
thus being at the range of senses.
These three ontological domains are contingently related to the extent
that the moves from the real to the actual and from the actual to the
empirical (e.g., the exercise and manifestation of a causal mechanism,
respectively) are possible but not mandatory (Ackroyd & Fleetwood,
2000a). All the observations and experiences made by scholars and
researchers or by lay people (at the domain of the empirical) necessarily
presuppose the exercise (at the domain of the actual) of powers or causal
mechanisms and conﬁgurations (residing at the domain of the real), under
particular contingencies (again at the domains of the actual and empirical).
So, one can understand now why the operation of a causal mechanism may
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be difﬁcult or even impossible to identify empirically (and its effects difﬁcult
or impossible to observe or experience), when other (often countervailing)
mechanisms are at work and the effects of the latter impede, override, or
conceal the effects of the former (e.g., one attempts to open a door that is
locked by key). The likes of Sayer (1984, fn. 42, p. 280) notwithstanding, the
author does not subscribe to Bhaskar’s (1975) view that causal mechanisms
and conﬁgurations need to be either unobservable or less observable than
the effects that are capable of producing (i.e., resulting events).
In short, a stratiﬁed, relational, and transformational ontology is
presumed by critical realism (Fleetwood, 2001). Diverse and interrelated
entities and heterogeneous events can be found (at different strata) within a
layered, open, and evolving world. By contrast, empirical realist ontology of
positivists conﬂates the domain of the real with that of the empirical, hence
assuming that all that exists is inevitably at the range of human senses. As a
result, positivists fail to see the distinction between a causal mechanism, its
exercise, and the outcomes there. Positivism features a ‘‘ﬂat’’ or ‘‘depthless’’
ontology (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000a; Fleetwood, 2001).
3.3.2. Epistemology
‘‘Concept-Dependence,’’ but not ‘‘Concept-Determination,’’ of the
World. The world is what it is independently of one’s identiﬁcation (of
it). The relation between objects and subjects (i.e., the world’s constituents
and scholars and researchers and even lay people, respectively) is contingent
for objects exist regardless of any inquiry made on the former by subjects.
Contingency notwithstanding, the world is ‘‘concept-dependent’’ for one
can know it at length via available (both scientiﬁc and lay) discourses. One’s
access to the world, however, is partial and mediated. ‘‘[W]e cannot gain
access to the world independently of the concepts we use’’ (Fleetwood &
Ackroyd, 2004b, p. 3). One cannot step outside discourse to understand the
world – such an Archimedean point is inaccessible.
The largely nonmaterial (i.e., social) world in particular is for the most
part ‘‘concept-dependent.’’ Social entities and events are intrinsically
‘‘meaningful,’’ that is to say, what social entities and events depend strongly
on what they mean to humans (Sayer, 1984). As a consequence, meaning
is constitutive of the social world. Meaning is created within a language,
through the ‘‘play of difference’’ or ‘‘sense-relations’’ among concepts –
for instance, two terms being synonymous, antonymous, or heteronymous
(Saussure, 1916 [1977]). The entities and events of the natural world,
however, are intrinsically ‘‘meaningless’’ since what those entities and events
are does not depend on what their meaning is. One is bound to have a single
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and a double ‘‘hermeneutic’’ in natural and social sciences, respectively
(Sayer, 1984): in natural science, one sees the construction and sharing of
meaning only taking place within scientiﬁc communities (e.g., concerning
natural entities and events studied); on the contrary, in social science,
meaning is developed by and shared within communities of scholars and
researchers and also within own objects of study (e.g., inquired social
entities themselves).
That the world can be known (i.e., described and explained) at large
through the use of human discourse – hence that there is no such thing as an
‘‘unmediated’’ or ‘‘neutral’’ access to the world – does not make the world
a mere product of discourse. Although the world is largely concept-
dependent, it is not completely ‘‘concept-determined.’’
Descriptive and Performative Roles of Knowledge. The world is more than
discourse, contra claims of most postmodernists. Even socially produced
entities (e.g., concepts, models, or theories) have a remarkable independence
from what scholars, researchers, or lay people think of, or say about
those entities. ‘‘To acknowledge that most social phenomena are concept-
dependent is not to imply, in idealist fashion, that they are dependent on
concepts alone, for it takes more than thinking to produce social institutions
and practices’’ (Sayer, 2004, p. 19, fn. 9).
All postmodernists who endorse a strong variant of social construction-
ism argue that discourse is all that exists (and as a consequence, that
discourse ought to be self-referential). For strong social constructionists, the
world as a whole is collapsed into discourse. By assuming the widespread
existence of ‘‘wishful thinking’’ (both individual and collective), postmo-
dernism equates ‘‘construal’’ of the world with the world’s ‘‘construction’’
(Sayer, 1984). Although construals may inform constructions (and
constructions in turn may be construed differently over time), it is not the
case that entities (as diverse as rocks, mountains, water, or social
institutions) emerge or change simply because one chooses to discursively
create or recreate those entities. For postmodernists, the ‘‘descriptive’’
(or ‘‘denotative’’) function of knowledge is neglected almost in the same
proportion that knowledge’s ‘‘performative’’ (or ‘‘constructive’’) role is
overemphasized. Since (real) referents are collapsed into respective (ideal)
terms or concepts, the epistemic fallacy is again committed (Bhaskar, 1975).
Strangely, both positivists and postmodernists commit the fallacy of
conﬂating the world with human knowledge of it – the only difference
being somewhat in the way that conﬂation is effected (Sayer, 2000).
Positivists take the world as synonymous with what one is able to know
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about (i.e., empirically observe or experiment), whereas for postmodernists
the world is whatever one socially or discursively constructs.
Although mind-independent existence applies to both natural and
social worlds, the latter is (as critical realists recognize) in part socially
constructed. Human agency is to some extent a requirement for the social
world’s existence; yet this does not mean that the social world is merely the
outcome of discursive human activities (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000a). The
world does not change simply because human discourse or knowledge of
the world is somehow altered (e.g., racial discrimination is not eradicated
when society changes discourse in favor of multiculturalism). Critical
realists take this into account and are thus ready to accept a ‘‘weak’’ version
of social constructionism.
Social World’s (Partial and Mediate) Discursive Construction. At a given
point in time, the social world is what it is independently of humans’
conception, knowledge, or discourse. Social phenomena, though partly
dependent on agents who create, reproduce, and transform them, generally
exist regardless of all scholars and researchers interested in their study
(Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000a).
The social world is only in part a deliberate construction of humankind,
being usually not in accord with what human constructors would want
the world to be in the ﬁrst place (Sayer, 2004). Social phenomena, once
constructed, gain an increasing independence from original founders, the
agents responsible for phenomena’s reproduction over time, and scholars
and researchers who possibly inquiry phenomena. ‘‘The social phenomena
that confront us today are mostly the product of [discursive and practical]
activities carried out before any current observations we make, and while it
is occasionally possible for researchers to inﬂuence [in the long term] what
they study, the latter phenomena are mostly others’ constructions, and not
necessarily intended ones at that’’ (Sayer, 2004, p. 7, emphasis added).
The inﬂuence of human knowledge on the world is both potential and
mediate, for that inﬂuence can never be effected and frequently occurs in
the long term – something surprisingly overlooked by postmodernists.
Only some knowledge claims prove inﬂuential enough to change de facto
the world and even when that is the case, it is mostly past rather than
contemporary knowledge that constructs the world. Knowledge is neither
powerless nor all-powerful: knowledge is potentially causal, that is, capable
to change the world. Contra postmodernists’ idealism, knowledge alone
does not modify completely the world (e.g., whenever knowledge is
developed or revised, a ‘‘new’’ world is not created or reshaped ipso facto).
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Critical realists recognize the performative role of knowledge, though
noting that performativity depends on how knowledge is related to the
(extradiscursive) world, that is, the knowledge’s degree of ‘‘practical
adequacy’’ (Sayer, 2004). Practice is to a large degree the link between
knowledge and the world, as seen below.
Existence of both intra- and extradiscursive realms within the world is
acknowledged by critical realism, in opposition to postmodernist and
positivist standpoints that just take for granted the nonemptiness of the
former and the latter realms, respectively (Sayer, 2000).
‘‘Theory-Laden’’ Observation. In spite of the world’s mind-independence
(absolute in the natural world, relative in the social world), the human mind
is not ‘‘world-independent.’’ When one looks at or perceives the world, some
sort of preunderstanding is always present (e.g., a frame of reference,
conceptual framework, theory, or mere belief), though it is not often
reﬂected on or even noticed. As Kant (1781 [1999]) reasons, ‘‘perception
without conception is blind,’’ whereas ‘‘conception without perception
is empty.’’ Human senses are inevitably ‘‘conceptually tainted.’’ Critical
realists assume that human observation is theory-laden or ‘‘conceptually
mediated,’’ instead of the theory-neutral observation postulated by
positivism.
Knowledge, Practice, and the World. One understands the world (and
develops knowledge of it) by observing, experimenting, and most
importantly, practically intervening on the world. In addition to
knowledge resulting from the world’s observation and experimentation
(epistemological means privileged by positivists), a great part of knowledge
is obtained through both practical intervention in the world and human
interaction and communication (Sayer, 1984).
The relation between knowledge and the world is not one of
‘‘correspondence’’ or ‘‘mirroring’’ involving the pursuit of (unsound)
absolute truth. This relation is not merely contemplative or passive but
rather interactive and characterized by (a degree of) practical adequacy.
For knowledge, instead of aiming to be in positivist fashion a mirror of
the world (i.e., ‘‘absolutely true at all times’’ or ‘‘true with a capital T’’),
needs to be to some extent ‘‘practically adequate.’’ Knowledge, besides
describing and explaining (hence enabling reference to) and constructing in
part the world, informs and guides practice within the world. So, referential,
performative, and practical functions of knowledge all need to be afﬁrmed.
Knowledge and practice are ‘‘reciprocally conﬁrming’’ as each both
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legitimates and is legitimated by the other (Sayer, 1984). Given reciprocal
conﬁrmation, changes in knowledge and practice usually go hand in hand.
Inadmissible Judgmental Relativism. Despite accepting postmodernism’s
epistemic relativism, critical realism rejects judgmental relativism: though
the world is largely known via discourse (i.e., necessarily under some
description or from a particular perspective), humans can still assess which
accounts (in general only a few) are more practically adequate than others.
For there is always to some extent feedback from the world owing to human
practical interventions within it (Sayer, 2004).
The ‘‘relativity’’ of truth upheld by postmodernists impedes (or at the
least implies the suspension of ) the assessment and comparison of practical
adequacy of diverse knowledge claims and thus evades the possibility of
claims’ falsiﬁcation. The idea that ‘‘anything goes’’ seems unsound for
judging the practical adequacy of knowledge. This is in agreement with that
humans do inevitably all the time in everyday life, to avoid undesired
practical consequences, for instance, when looking for cars before crossing a
road (Sayer, 1984). The common posture of postmodernists is to accept all
knowledge as equally valid; yet some postmodernists take the alternative
route that is to doubt all knowledge. This latter choice is mindless as well
because, as Sayer (2004) notes, to be skeptical about a knowledge claim
implies accepting the truth or validity of other claims used as grounds for
that skepticism – that is, one cannot call into question everything. Critical
realists take as a fallacy the postmodernist idea that unless one has ‘‘true’’
knowledge, one is only left with total absence of knowledge, or in other
words, complete ignorance. The critical realist argument is that humans ﬁnd
themselves most of the time somewhere between these two poles.
Multiplicity and (Uneven) Fallibility of Knowledge. Theoretical pluralism
is acknowledged and fostered by critical realists. Human beings develop
multiple and unevenly practically adequate (and often contradictory)
accounts of a ‘‘single’’ world, with all of those accounts remaining open
to challenge. There is no indisputable knowledge, scientiﬁc or lay – though
these two kinds of knowledge naturally differ (Fleetwood, 2005). All
knowledge is fallible, but not equally so: treating all knowledge as equally
fallible would be a mistake as dangerous as that of treating all knowledge as
equally true. Critical realism is at odds with any kind of ‘‘foundationalism’’
or ‘‘taken-for-grantedness.’’ ‘‘It is the [common] experience of the fallibility
of our knowledge, of mistaking things and being taken by surprise (y),’’ as
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Sayer (2004, p. 6) says, that lends weight to realist conviction. Ontological
realism and ‘‘epistemological fallibilism’’ are two sides of the same coin.
The ‘‘relative’’ fallibility of knowledge is unrecognized by positivists
that privilege scientiﬁc knowledge to the disfavor of lay knowledge. And
postmodernists implicitly take all knowledge as unerring (because of
knowledge’s performativity). Postmodernists try to distance themselves
from positivists by endorsing relativist and in many cases, strong social
constructionist viewpoints. But strikingly, postmodernists are prone to be as
foundationalists as the ones they argue against. First, if discourse exhausts
completely the world (i.e., wishful thinking prevails), then human knowl-
edge ought to be infallible. For it is contradictory to accept the fallibility of
knowledge while simultaneously acknowledging that knowledge is capable
of constructing the world as a whole. Second, relativism allegedly promotes
‘‘open-mindedness,’’ eschewing any form of absolutism. By taking all
accounts as relative (i.e., equally ‘‘true’’), postmodernists have an excellent
excuse to avoid any criticisms whatsoever (e.g., of an empirical character).
That escape from counterarguments possibly contributes to the perpetua-
tion of the status quo. In sum, a different kind of foundationalism is to be
found within postmodernism.
The Objectives of Science. Critical realist science aims to understand or
make sense of (i.e., describe and explain) the many-sided world one inhabits.
The difﬁculties of making science stem not only from the multi-
dimensionality and mind-independent existence of the world, but also
from the world’s nonperennial nature (i.e., its never-ending, usually gradual
yet at times drastic change).
Bhaskar (1998, 1975) notes the presence of transitive and intransitive
dimensions in science. This means that science comprises (‘‘ontic’’) objects
of study and (‘‘epistemic’’) resources that scholars and researchers employ
to inquire those objects (e.g., theories, research techniques, and so on) –
while the latter are likely to change continuously (sometimes even
radically), the former endure (regardless of latter’s inﬂuence) though are
not immutable. Scholars and researchers (and lay people) face stable but
not static referents (i.e., the world) and develop references to (namely
description and explanation of ) referents, partly via stable but not static
terms, models, and theories.
World’s Descriptions, Explanations, and (Tendential) Predictions. Science
strives to discover the nature of world (i.e., entities’ powers, liabilities, and
tendencies) and thus to increase human ability to explain the occurrence of
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events (Secord, 1986). Scholars and researchers aim to develop robust yet
tentative theories (i.e., descriptive and explanatory ‘‘causal accounts’’) of
extant causal powers, mechanisms, and conﬁgurations at work that are
potentially responsible for bringing about inquired events (Fleetwood,
2007a). Critical realist scholars and researchers attempt to develop a ‘‘bird’s-
eye view’’ on the phenomenon of interest, instead of the ‘‘god’s-eye view’’
pursued by positivists (Sayer, 2000). Critical realist research switches from
the domains of the ‘‘empirical’’ and ‘‘actual’’ to the domain of the ‘‘real,’’
that is, from observed and experienced events to the entities and powers
(or causal mechanisms and conﬁgurations) ultimately responsible for the
former’s occurrence (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000a). As Lawson (2001)
reasons, critical realism stresses the need to ‘‘go back to reality.’’
Whenever holding sound knowledge on the world’s causal mechanisms
and conﬁgurations and on prevailing contingent conditions, scholars and
researchers are often capable of assessing the ‘‘causal efﬁcacy’’ of co- and
countertendencies at work, hence possibly providing ‘‘highly qualiﬁed’’
predictions about the likelihood of the occurrence of certain events.
So-called ‘‘tendential predictions’’ about the future, though not totally
accurate, are certainly not of a spurious quality (Fleetwood, 2007a).
The outcome of the conﬂux of several co- and countertendencies
prevailing is impossible to predict outrightly: ‘‘[T]he future (y) is real but
not yet determined and therefore consists of a multiplicity of different
possibilities (y)’’ (Patomaki, 2006, p. 29). Which of converging or opposing
tendencies are more forceful and likely to prevail is a matter to be assessed
empirically by scholars and researchers (Fleetwood, 2004). Against
allegations of positivists (e.g., Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948), the maturity
of any science is unrelated to its predictive power – for the openness of the
world makes highly improbable the existence of such absolute power.
Descriptive and explanatory powers of science (that can always be improved
or extended) are much more adequate as epistemic criteria for evaluating
scientiﬁc knowledge.
Positivists are only capable of offering predictions of a spurious precision
and ‘‘emaciated explanations’’ at the most (Hesketh & Fleetwood, 2006,
2007). The phenomenon to be explained (explanandum) is logically deduced
from both a universal regularity (commonly expressed in a law) and a set of
initial conditions (explanans) – review the ‘‘logicism’’ of the deductive-
nomological model used by positivists in Section 3.1.3. No explanation of
what produces the phenomenon of interest is, however, given. Positivists
confuse prediction with explanation (so-called ‘‘symmetry thesis’’), the only
difference between these two being in the occurrence of the phenomenon to
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be explained or predicted: explain the phenomenon after its occurrence
(what may also be called ‘‘postdiction,’’ i.e., to ‘‘predict’’ the past) or predict
the forthcoming occurrence of the phenomenon, respectively (Fleetwood,
2002b). A prediction, even if accurate, does not constitute per se an
explanation. Positivists offer for the most part ‘‘nonexplanatory’’ predic-
tions and on occasion a few ‘‘nonpredictive’’ explanations.
Given the openness of the world (and the transfactuality of entities’
powers), events cannot be accurately predicted although underlying causes
(i.e., causal mechanisms and conﬁgurations) can often be uncovered by
scholars and researchers. Explanation supplants (tendential) prediction as
the ultimate purpose of critical realist science (Fleetwood, 2001) – though
the former serve as source for the latter.
Practically Adequate, Incomplete, and Revisable Scientiﬁc Knowledge.
Science aims to develop an increasingly practically adequate knowledge of
the world. Since scientiﬁc knowledge varies in epistemic status (being more
or less practically adequate) and is necessarily incomplete and revisable,
a great part of scholars’ and researchers’ time is devoted to assess and
improve the degree of practical adequacy of that knowledge. This difﬁcult
but not all-or-nothing task of scholars and researchers adds up to ‘‘epistemic
gain’’ (Sayer, 2004, 1984).
Incompleteness of knowledge claims is primarily justiﬁed by the world’s
many-sidedness and continuous change, though also derives in part from the
lack of knowledge on possible contingencies and the way these contingencies
impact on effects resulting from the exercise of powers (even when there is
knowledge about entities and causal powers, mechanisms, and conﬁgura-
tions at work). Incompleteness can always be found in scientiﬁc work on
account of ‘‘abstractions’’ that scholars and researchers make in research
(i.e., ‘‘something’’ is consciously left out of descriptions and explanations) or
deliberate and partial trimming of knowledge (for preexisting stock of
knowledge possessed by other scholars and researchers renders unnecessary
the completeness of arguments).
Context-Dependence of Scientiﬁc Knowledge and the Need for Reﬂexivity.
Science is in part as a social, by and large male-dominated activity (Sayer,
2000). Scientiﬁc knowledge is to some extent socially constructed, being
affected by social relations that scholars and researchers establish, develop,
and maintain among themselves. Scientiﬁc knowledge emerges, thrives, and
endures on the basis of negotiated consensus between theory developers and
users, within respective scientiﬁc communities – sociology of science thus
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deserves acknowledgement. Of course, this is not to imply – as
postmodernists claim – that scholars’ and researchers’ interrelations are
the unique (or primary) determinants in the development and evaluation
of scientiﬁc knowledge, for intellectual scrutiny features eminently in that
process.
All human knowledge (not only scientiﬁc) is partly a social construction.
Knowledge is always ‘‘situated,’’ bearing the marks of its social origins and
molded by the social background of knowledge’s proponents, adherents,
and even ﬁercest contenders (e.g., gender, race, personality, or personal
values). One cannot assume the ‘‘context-independence’’ of knowledge
(Sayer, 2000). Moreover, the form of produced knowledge also impacts on
content. For critical realists, the deployment of metaphors and analogies in
scientiﬁc knowledge is unobjectionable, as admissible as that of logic and
even quantitative techniques. For example, in the industrial marketing
and purchasing ﬁeld of study, Easton and Araujo (1993) and Alajoutsijarvi,
Eriksson, and Tikkanen (2001) both address the widespread use of
metaphors in so-called markets-as-networks theory. Easton and Araujo
(1997) go even further by suggesting that literary criticism bears
resemblances with criticisms made by management scholars and researchers
on own (and others’) conceptual and empirical works – an argument that is
not senseless if one reﬂects on the habit of referring to a particular body of
theory as ‘‘literature’’ (Massey, 1996). Positivists, on the contrary, discard
all kinds of nonlogical or nonmathematical reasoning in science.
The ‘‘context-dependent’’ character of knowledge makes ‘‘reﬂexivity’’
advisable, particularly with respect to scientiﬁc knowledge (Bourdieu, 2004).
Reﬂexivity denotes all efforts to critically expose the social context in which
knowledge is created, developed, and assessed. This is not to say that either
ad hominem or ad feminam arguments (opposing the male or female
making the knowledge claim, not the claim in and of itself) are admissible.
To admit (enabling or constraining) social inﬂuences on any kind of
knowledge is not an invitation to grant ‘‘epistemic authority’’ to the claims
of an individual or group (whether dominant or oppressed).
‘‘Situatedness’’ and (Tentative) Objectivity of Scientiﬁc Knowledge. That
scientiﬁc knowledge is situated needs not threaten its objectivity, imply the
absence of knowledge’s practical adequacy or signal a relativist position.
Science is never ‘‘value-free’’; yet ‘‘value-ladenness’’ does not forego the
possibility of aiming at objectivity in research and the scientiﬁc knowledge
developed. Sayer (1984) exposes three meanings for the notions of
‘‘objectivity’’ and ‘‘subjectivity’’: ‘‘value-neutrality’’ or value-ladenness of
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knowledge, presence or absence of truth in knowledge, and that knowledge
pertains to the nature of objects or to what subjects think of those objects.
Scientiﬁc knowledge is both objective and subjective (in the third above-
mentioned sense) for it is developed by subjects (scholars and researchers)
about objects of study (the world). Although scientiﬁc knowledge is
(like any other knowledge) ‘‘value-laden,’’ it is not necessarily ‘‘untrue’’ or
subjective. Overly subjectivist conception of values is a prominent
presumption of positivism.
It is not the case that one has either some ‘‘pure,’’ value-free, objective
science or instead the complete absence of science, that is, ‘‘purely
subjective’’ opinion, ﬁction, or fantasy. That knowledge claims are
‘‘epistemically relative’’ (i.e., partly shaped by social and cultural back-
grounds) does not mean one has to accept judgmental relativism and thus
assume that it is impossible to differentiate between ‘‘better’’ and ‘‘worse’’
(or more and less practically adequate) knowledge claims. For instance, one
might know ‘‘something’’ about the signiﬁcance of business relationships
for the ﬁrm (see Sousa & Castro, this volume), without knowing that with
absolute certainty and even without being able to explain every causal
power, mechanism, or conﬁguration possibly bringing that signiﬁcance
about. In this case, if one takes the decision to abandon what one does know
about relationship signiﬁcance on (pomo) grounds that one knows nothing
at all, one would be abdicating own (mandatory) intellectual responsibility.
‘‘Abstract’’ and ‘‘Concrete’’ Levels in Research. Critical realist research is
undertaken at ‘‘abstract’’ level (of tentatively identiﬁed entities’ structures,
powers, and tendencies, or causal mechanisms and conﬁgurations at
work) or at ‘‘concrete’’ level (of prevailing contingencies and observed
or experienced events) or at both levels (Sayer, 1984). At abstract
(or ‘‘conceptual’’) level, structures of entities as well as entities’ powers
and tendencies or causal mechanisms and conﬁgurations that entities as
a whole constitute, are all conceptually postulated.
Conceptualizations may be arrived at or only tested after being
heuristically posited, and corroborated or altered via research undertaken
at concrete (or ‘‘empirical’’) level. Empirical research, while not absolutely
necessary for identifying structures and powers of entities or causal
mechanisms and conﬁgurations at work, is helpful in clariﬁcation of effects
resulting from the exercise of those causal phenomena (given the presence of
diverse contingent conditions). Critical realists substitute practical adequacy
for truth as the key criterion for evaluation of scientiﬁc knowledge resulting
from both abstract and concrete research.
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Assessment, Extension, and Improvement of Scientiﬁc Knowledge. Contra
allegations of many antirealists (not only positivists), critical realist
knowledge developed is not tautological. Critical realists, in face of certain
causal mechanisms and conﬁgurations at work (and possibly observed or
experienced in concrete research), cannot justify the nonoccurrence of
expected events (i.e., empirical ‘‘manifestation’’ of postulated dominating
tendencies) with the argument that ‘‘some countervailing causal phenomena
must be prevailing.’’
To discover which of tendencies prevail (and which do not) at a certain
contextual setting and point in time is an empirical (yet not necessarily
easy) matter. Falsiﬁcation of knowledge claims is not avoided by the appeal
to countertendencies or counteracting causal powers, mechanisms, and
conﬁgurations. If expected events are not brought about, scholars and
researchers are impelled to develop knowledge on countervailing structures,
powers, and tendencies, and most importantly, why these latter override the
allegedly prevailing former tendencies (i.e., to say, the relative contribution
of all postulated causal powers, mechanisms, and conﬁgurations to the
generation of observed or experienced events).
Empirical evaluation is insufﬁcient to verify or falsify once and for all
scientiﬁc knowledge. All empirical research needs to be both ‘‘theoretically
informed’’ and ‘‘theoretically informative’’ (Sayer, 2000). Critical realists
thus endorse a spiral-like approach to theory and evidence in research:
evidence accumulated by scholars and researchers is likely to react back on
(initial) theory, possibly causing theoretical (re)evaluation and as a result
the change, extension, or even rejection of that theory. For instance, after
postulating the existence of a causal mechanism, scholars and researchers
are urged to determine (empirically) if that mechanism acts the way it is
supposed to act and does bring about the event that is to be explained.
Cross-Fertilizing Scientiﬁc Knowledge. Critical realists do not see scientiﬁc
knowledge as composed of discrete analytical blocks. Any theory is difﬁcult
to delimit since it is not clear where to draw theory’s temporal and spatial
boundaries of applicability (Dubin, 1969). In antirelativist fashion, theories
are ‘‘internally differentiated’’ but overlapping. One recognizes the hetero-
geneity of theories and argues: ﬁrst, that theoretical cross-fertilization is not
only possible but desirable also – for alternative theories are not in general
mutually exclusive, emphasizing different and one-sided aspects of the
world, and therefore, likely to overall enhance description and explanation
of underlying causal powers, mechanisms, and conﬁgurations at work; and
second, that almost endless intertheory disputes easily found throughout
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science may be solved by drawing on theories’ ‘‘areas of agreement.’’ Both
the existence of (strong and weak) connections among theories and the
possibility of establishing and developing new intertheory linkages deserve
acknowledgment. The development process of scientiﬁc knowledge is
neither wholly continuous nor totally discontinuous, against respective
claims of positivists and postmodernists.
The standpoints of scholars and researchers as well as espoused theories
are not necessarily absolutely antagonistic or ‘‘incommensurable.’’ ‘‘Incom-
mensurability’’ of rival theories alleged by Kuhn (1970) or by his followers
is an overstatement: ‘‘[W]here theories are in contradiction, that implies
they have something in common over which they can contradict one
another’’ (Sayer, 2004, p. 8). Synthesis, that is, the common outcome of
cross-fertilization, is feasible. Eclectic understanding that is likely to result
from synthesis, instead of (needed but insufﬁcient) specialist understanding,
needs further promotion in research (Fleetwood & Ackroyd, 2004b).
Critical realism dispenses with ‘‘disciplinary parochialism’’ and its close
relative ‘‘disciplinary imperialism’’ (Sayer, 2000). Some inﬂuential scientiﬁc
knowledge produced is in essence inter-disciplinary (e.g., evolutionary views
of the business world).
3.3.3. Methodology
Critical realism advocates that the object of study of any science should
dictate the research method to employ – while acknowledging that the
primary aims pursued by all scholars and researchers are the (tentative)
description and explanation of the world’s phenomena (Sayer, 1984).
Need for both Structural and Etiological Analyses. To attain science’s
primary aims, scholars and researchers need to undertake structural
and etiological analyses of the world (Sayer, 1984). As a result of these
analyses, structures, powers, and tendencies of the world’s entities and
prevailing contingencies can be described; and the ensuing events can be
explained by appeal to causal powers, mechanisms, and conﬁgura-
tions at work, respectively. Both structural and etiological analyses are
typically qualitative and involve a process of abstraction that can be on
occasion supplemented by the use of quantitative techniques (e.g., ‘‘variance
analysis’’ largely favored by positivists). The deployment of any quantitative
apparatus generally implies subscribing to assumptions (even if transitory or
spatially partial) of closed systems and Humean causality. It is thus
very difﬁcult to reconcile qualitative and quantitative research methods on
the same research.
Metatheories in Research 493
Abstracting from (Features of) the World. Critical realists take abstraction
(i.e., isolation in thought of a one-sided feature of a particular, multi-
dimensional phenomenon) as the primary tool at the disposal of scholars
and researchers. To focus on a particular feature of the phenomenon of
interest (i.e., to abstract from all other, deemed irrelevant, features that
together constitute that phenomenon) is a proper way to inquire the
complex and many-sided entities and events of the world. Abstraction
should not be confused with ‘‘reductionism’’ (i.e., to explain a many-sided
phenomenon by ‘‘reducing’’ it to but one of multiple constituents).
Treating the world’s phenomena as ‘‘unidimensional’’ – a regular mistake
committed by positivists – is not tantamount to abstract (Sayer, 1984). Nor
should abstraction be confused with ﬁctionalization (as in, e.g., neoclassical
economics). Abstractions, namely analytical decompositions or ‘‘decon-
structions’’ of the world, must be made very carefully (e.g., to avoid
‘‘dividing’’ what is indivisible or creating ﬁctions). Recurrent abstraction
from time is counterproductive for it implies the neglect of change (e.g.,
taking place within structures, causal powers, mechanisms, and conﬁgura-
tions, or contingencies; Sayer, 2000).
Understanding the world, via systematic recourse to abstraction, proceeds
as follows: by starting from the multidimensional world (and abstracting
from all but one of its features), one is likely to grasp the unidimensional;
then by effecting all the necessary abstractions to fully deconstruct the
world’s multidimensionality; and, later on by combining or synthesizing the
knowledge accruing from each of the world’s one-sidedness abstractions,
to (tentatively) understand the many-sidedness of the world. Simply put,
world- abstractions and abstractions- world. Even when all three steps
are taken, one cannot be certain that scholars and researchers are able
to develop a thorough understanding of the world (in part owing to its
continuous and unpredictable change).
‘‘Retroducing’’ and ‘‘Retrodicting’’. In addition to abstraction, scholars
and researchers are advised to employ in research both ‘‘retroduction’’
and ‘‘retrodiction’’ processes, whereby: causal powers, mechanisms, and
conﬁgurations (capable of producing inquired events) are postulated; and
previous knowledge of other causal powers, mechanisms, and conﬁgurations
(e.g., knowledge produced at more or less ‘‘distant’’ ﬁelds of study) is
brought to bear on the object of study, respectively (Lawson, 1997; Sayer,
1984). Retroduction (or ‘‘abduction’’) is a mode of inference that, starting
from a phenomenon of interest, enables the postulation of a structure,
power, or tendency (or a causal mechanism or conﬁguration) that may
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account for the occurrence of that phenomenon. One can take advantage of
Lawson’s (1997, p. 24) insightful description of retroduction: ‘‘If deduction
is illustrated by the move from the general claim that ‘all ravens are black’ to
the particular inference that the next one seen will be black, and induction
by the move from the particular observation of numerous black ravens to
the general claim that ‘all ravens are black’, retroductive or abductive
reasoning is indicated by a move from the observation of numerous black
ravens to a theory of a mechanism intrinsic (y) to ravens which disposes
them to be black.’’ Retroduction thus displaces induction and deduction as
preferred mode of inference. The use of induction and deduction, as heavily
espoused by positivists, is insufﬁcient for the development of robust
scientiﬁc knowledge.
Science is in essence a creative, both individual and collective endeavor
that makes extensive use of abstraction, retroduction, and retrodiction.
Scholars and researchers develop knowledge of the world by: abstracting
from (i.e., omitting) relatively unimportant aspects of objects of study;
retroducing to (i.e., postulating the existence of ) certain causal powers,
mechanisms, or conﬁgurations that can be responsible for bringing about
the events to explain; and retrodicting to some established theories and
models (in own ﬁelds of study or elsewhere) pertaining to other structures,
powers, and tendencies at work.
Scientiﬁc Research, Mostly of a Qualitative Character. Critical realist
research is ‘‘intensive’’ or idiographic (Sayer, 1984). The preferential test
for research is ‘‘triangulation,’’ that is, the simultaneous use of diverse
techniques (e.g., direct observation, interviews, documentary analysis, and
action research). The knowledge developed in intensive research can be
‘‘generalizable’’ (e.g., to other phenomena taking place at a different space
and time) – against the view of positivists that presume generalization to be
property of extensive or nomothetical research.
Critical realists do not make an apology for the sole use of qualitative
research. Mostly qualitative (but also on occasion quantitative) research
techniques are employed by scholars and researchers in accord with the
speciﬁcity of objects of study. Yet, critical realists explicitly reject the
widespread (positivist) argument that only quantitative-based science is
capable to supply robust descriptions, explanations, and predictions of
the world. Mathematics or ‘‘mathematical formalism’’ is the dominant
(nonstructural and nonetiological) language in positivist science, being in
and of itself unable to provide any knowledge on (structures and causes of)
the world (Sayer, 1984). The identiﬁcation of a mathematical association
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(e.g., a positive correlation between two events) needs not imply any
causality – or alternatively, the absence of that association needs not entail
the absence of causality (Fleetwood, 2001). Although being totally ‘‘blind’’
to causality, mathematics has some possible applications in research – for
instance, whenever scholars and researchers want or need to represent
quantitative effects ensuing from the exercise of an entity’s powers. Yet
causality is an ‘‘extra-mathematical’’ content, imputed to positivist
mathematical models or frameworks. In line with Fleetwood (2001), one
argues that positivists often smuggle causality into mathematics.
Qualitative research is to be effected when one’s aim is the (tentative)
disclosure of the world’s causality. Critical realists are aware of the perils of
(trying to) quantify inherently qualitative, multidimensional, and (in part
subjectively understood) evolving phenomena.
3.3.4. Etiology
Causality as Powers. Causality pertains to the production of change.
‘‘[A] cause is whatever produces change (y)’’ (Sayer, 2004, p. 17). Critical
realists substitute the conception of ‘‘causality as powers’’ for ‘‘causality as
event regularities or cause-effect relations’’ (Fleetwood, 2001). Against the
positivist view, to explain a phenomenon is not to search for other
(temporally preceding) phenomena but to unearth the former’s underlying
structure, powers, and tendencies. Positivism is usually entangled in
so-called ‘‘associational thinking’’ for assumes that what can go together
must go together, thus mistaking contingency for necessity (Sayer, 2000). By
subscribing to spurious cause–effect relations (hence confusing temporal
contiguity with causality), positivists either commit the ‘‘fallacy of afﬁrming
the consequent’’ (given the antecedent’s occurrence) or enter into a ‘‘naive
falsiﬁcation’’ (i.e., assume that the consequence’s nonoccurrence implies the
falsiﬁcation of postulated cause–effect relation).
Critical realists are unable to grasp how the inductive inference – that
succeeding events are connected via causality – can be soundly justiﬁed.
As Sayer (1984) asks, how can a positivist vindicate the assertion that the
(preceding) event X is the cause of (following) Y? Or, in other words, how
can a positivist justify that the future will resemble exactly the past? This
so-called ‘‘problem of induction’’ is ﬁrst put forward by Hume.
All causes can be au fond discovered in the nature (i.e., structural
properties) of the world’s entities and need not be observable or physical
(Secord, 1986). Critical realists often cite, as an illustrative example, the
claim that human reasons can be causes of (observed) events (Sayer, 1984).
Reasons can drive human behavior but not in a straightforward manner: as
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one knows, the same reason is able to generate different events while a same
effect may be brought about by a diversity of reasons (Sayer, 2004).
For positivists, however, neither human reasons nor discourse can be
causal. Positivists can be accused of being ‘‘naturalists’’ and ‘‘materialists’’
whenever argue, respectively, that the social world resembles the natural
world and thus the former can be inquired and understood in the same
manner as the latter (i.e., exclusively via application of quantitative research
techniques and inductive and deductive modes of inference); and the world
as a whole is physical and observable. In a rather extreme reaction to
this positivist stance, postmodernists embark on a crude idealism and take
discourse as the unique and fundamental cause of the world, neglecting
altogether the existence of extradiscursive and nonmaterial causes.
In sum, critical realism recognizes that causes can be unobservable and
immaterial (hence resistant to observation, experimentation, measurement,
or quantiﬁcation) and that an extramaterial, discursive part of the world
exists (thus being only in part naturalist and materialist).
The World Is Multiply Caused. ‘‘[N]othing happens without a cause. (y)
[W]e continue to regard unanswered causal questions as just that – not as
proven cases of indeterminacy [as if ‘God plays dice’]’’ (Collier, 1994,
p. 127). The world is an open system, being codetermined by multiple and
interacting causes (review Section 3.3.1 on ontology).
Several and interrelated structures, powers, and tendencies somehow
(causally) govern the world, irrespective of prevailing contingencies and
(possibly unforeseen) events brought about (Fleetwood, 2001). Causality is
therefore complex, that is to say, multicausality prevails in the world.
Multiplex causality is difﬁcult to unequivocally identify by scholars and
researchers (let alone lay people) on account of three main reasons
(Fleetwood, 2007a): several causal powers, mechanisms, and conﬁgurations
can be at work simultaneously (and, as one acknowledges, diverse powers
may bring about the same effects); some causal priority (or hierarchy) is
likely to exist in the world for not all causes are equally relevant in the
world’s codetermination; and the world is in part subject to the exercise of
human agency (though this agency is not entirely capricious and is liable to
change). Identiﬁcation of the world’s causality may be further complicated
by the fact that some underlying causes may lie outside of scholars’ and
researchers’ primary ﬁeld of study or specialization (Fleetwood, 2007a).
Critical realism dispenses with determinism and randomness advocated
by positivists and postmodernists, respectively. Determinism is dismissed
owing to the openness of the world and the existence of contingency and
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change in it – one can often ﬁnd path-dependence in the world’s change, that
is, from the ‘‘past’’ and ‘‘other places’’ to the ‘‘now’’ and ‘‘here’’ (Sayer,
2000). Randomness, namely that ‘‘anything can happen anywhere,’’ is
not a feature of the world. Whatever happens need not be what could
have happened and is explained by existing entities and structures, powers,
and tendencies (or causal mechanisms and conﬁgurations at work) and
prevailing contingencies of the world.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper draws heavily on the works of Sayer (1984, 2000) and Fleetwood
(2001, 2004, 2005) and illuminating views of these two critical realists on
metatheory in general and on critical realism in particular. Metatheoretical
taxonomies devised by Ackroyd (2004, pp. 150–151) and Fleetwood (2007a,
p. 3) also provide invaluable help in identifying the distinguishing
assumptions of each metatheory discussed here.
Scholars and researchers build often implicitly on one of the three
metatheories, that is to say, a distinctive set of assumptions concerning
ontology, epistemology, methodology, and etiology: either take the world
as a closed system wherein cause–effect relations can be observed or
experienced (i.e., positivism); or instead consider the world to be socially
constructed by human beings via discourse or interaction and convention
(i.e., postmodernism); or acknowledge the largely mind-independence of the
world, a world composed of multiple (complexly structured and powerful)
entities and (structureless and powerless) events (i.e., critical realism).
Ontological, epistemological, methodological, and etiological assump-
tions of the above-mentioned metatheories are addressed exhaustively
elsewhere (Bhaskar, 1998; D’Andrade, 1986; Fleetwood, 2001; Lawson,
2001; Sayer, 2000; Secord, 1986) and summarized in Table 1.
Each and every scholars and researchers should be made aware of
and reﬂect on the appropriateness of own metatheoretical commitments,
primarily by bearing in mind the object of study. For these (usually taken-
for-granted) commitments have a huge impact on the research process
and outcomes (e.g., theories or frameworks developed or empirical data
collected). Consideration of underlying metatheories is likely to reduce
greatly the possibility of being at cross-purposes (e.g., when criticizing an
opposite theory or challenging contradictory data). Understanding of why
substantive theories are adopted, reﬁned, extended, or instead opposed to
by scholars and researchers, is thus easier to attain. By bearing in mind the
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Table 1. Basic Assumptions of Positivism, Postmodernism, and Critical Realism.
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points of departure in research, one is able to avoid inadvertent slides into
ontological or epistemological incoherence (either over time or in a single
piece of analytical work).
Finally, this paper has the merit of presenting in detail to a large audience
(namely scholars and researchers of the industrial marketing and purchasing
ﬁeld of study, largely unaccustomed to explicit metatheoretical discussions)
alternatives to the mainstream (positivist) conception of social science:
postmodernism and especially critical realism.
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